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 1 
Summary 
Within the legal field free movement of workers the child has been given a 
right under Article 12 in Regulation 1612/68 to education in the host 
Member State. For the right to apply the child has to move and reside with 
the worker. The principle of equal treatment applies to the provision, which 
requires that, the Member State does not discriminate against children to 
workers. To give the right full effect the CJEU stipulated in Baumbast that 
the child has a right to be accompanied by a primary carer in order to be 
able to pursue the education successfully. The limits to the right has further 
been tried and tested in other cases, such as Texiera and Ibrahim.  
 
When the EU-citizenship became part of EU law, also the child became 
encompassed by this status. CJEU interpreted in Zhu and Chen that anyone 
who is a national of a Member State is an EU-citizen and has then a right to 
move and reside within the European Union as long as the EU-citizen has 
sufficient resources and a comprehensive sickness insurance. To give full 
effect to the Article, if a child exercising the right to free movement then the 
child has received a right to be accompanied by a primary carer. That 
concept has also been tried and test within the field of EU-citizenship inter 
alia in O and S, and in Iida. Furthermore, the EU-citizenship was held to be 
a status which at a minimum prevents Member States that a child loses the 
status as an EU citizen. That was held in Ruiz Zambrano and later 
confirmed in Alopka. 
 
In Brussel II-Regulation children shall be returned quickly if a child has 
been wrongfully abducted. Therefore, has a rather rigid system been created 
to facilitate the cooperation between national courts in issues concerning 
parental responsibility and claimed rights to custody of children in cross-
border situations. The court where the child is considered to be habitual 
resident is considered to be the best suited court to try these disputes. This 
raises problems in regard to what is the best interest of the child, if one 
thinks outside CJEU strict interpretation of the objective of the Brussels II-
Regulation.  
 
The Charter of Fundamental rights also contains Article 24 ‘the rights of the 
child’ which addresses children and their rights, the child have the right to 
be heard, the best interest shall be considered and also to remain in contact 
with both parents on a regular basis. The Charter of Fundamental Rights 
does effect the application of EU law and in particular when the application 
of law concerns a child then Article 24 shall come into play.    
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Sammanfattning 
Inom rättsområdet fri rörlighet av arbetare har barnet givits en rätt under 
Artikel 12 till utbildning i Förordning 1612/68 som barnet kan göra burk av 
i värd Medlems Staten. För att barnets rätt till utbildning ska bli tillämplig 
måste barnet flytta och bo tillsammans med föräldern som är arbetare. 
Likabehandlingsprincipen är tillämplig tillsammans med rätten till 
utbildning vilken kräver att Medlems Staten inte diskriminerar barn till 
arbetare. Rätten till utbildning har givits full effekt av EU-domstolen, som 
fastställde i Baumbast att barnet har rätt att bli åtföljt av sin förälder för att 
kunna göra bruk av sin rätt till utbildning i det fall föräldern skulle upphöra 
att arbeta och inte längre innehar statusen arbetstagare. Gränserna för när 
föräldern får åtfölja barnet utan att uppfylla några andra kriterier i EU-rätt 
har prövats i rättsfall som Texiera och Ibrahim.   
 
När EU medborgarskapet blev en del utav EU-rätten, omfattades även barn 
av den statusen. EU-domstolen fastställde detta i Zhu and Chen som tolkade 
att även rätt till fri rörlighet gav barnet en rätt att bli åtföljt av sin förälder 
som inte vara EU-medborgare. Bara denne såg till att barnet och föräldern 
hade tillräckligt med resurser och innehade en omfattande sjukförsäkring för 
att inte bli till en ekonomisk börda för Medlems Staten. Barnets rätt att bli 
åtföljt av en förälder har i flera fall prövats utav EU-domstolen. Utmärkande 
för EU-rätten är att det måste finnas en länk till utövad fri rörlighet för att 
EU-rätten ska bli tillämplig. I Ruiz Zambrano fanns det dock ingen sådan 
länk, men barnen som vara EU-medborgare riskerade att få lämna sitt 
hemland till följd av att föräldrarna inte vara medborgare där. För att 
förhindra att barn utsätts för denna risk att förlora sitt EU-medborgarskap 
tolkade EU-domstolen att Artikel 20 i Fördraget om EU:s Funktionssätt 
skulle ges effekt på sätt att barnens föräldrar fick stanna med barnen.  
 
Vidare syftar bland annat Bryssel II-Förordningen till att skydda barn ifrån 
att bli olovligt bortförda ifrån sitt hemland i fall då föräldrarna delar på 
vårdnaden. Om barnet har blivit bortfört ska samordningssystemet som 
Bryssel II-Förordningen föreskriver respekteras och domstolarna ska 
samarbeta för att barnet återlämnas snarast möjligt. Domstolen som har 
jurisdiktion att döma i frågor i dessa situationer är domstolen där barnet har 
domicil. Har barnet blivit olovligt bortfört så är det alltid den domstolen där 
barnet hade sin senast domicil som ska ha jurisdiktion, då den anses bäst 
lämpad att pröva saken utifrån barnet intresse. Så är även fallet när barnet 
har kommit att integreras i den andra Medlems Staten och det ger upphov 
till problematik kring i vilken utsträckning som barnets bästa verkligen 
beaktas.      
 
Den Europeiska Unionens Stadga om de Grundläggande Rättigheterna 
innehåller också Artikel 24 ’barnets rättigheter’, Artikeln adresserar barn när 
EU-rätt är applicerbar och situationen berör ett barn. I synnerhet ska hänsyn 
tas till barnets rätt att bli hörd, barnets bästa och barnets rätt att på en 
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regelbunden basis förbli i kontakt med båda föräldrarna. Den Europeiska 
Unionens Stadga om de Grundläggande Rättigheterna påverkar 
tillämpningen av EU-rätt och i synnerhet när ett barn är med i bilden 
aktualiseras tillämpningen av Artikel 24.   
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Abbreviations 
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EU  European Union 
 
OJ Official Journal 
 
TEU Treaty on European Union 
 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
 
UK United Kingdom 
 
UNCRC United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child  
 
UNTS United Nations Treaty Series 
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1 INTRODUCTION   
In the UNCRC the factor that constructs the concept child is age. Pursuant 
Article 1 therein ‘child means every human being below the age of eighteen 
years unless, und the law applicable to the child, majority is attained 
earlier’.1 EU has also embraced this age-based definition of who is to be 
considered to be a child.
2
 The Commission and Parliament uses the concept 
when referring to children in their child related work, with UNCRC as their 
reference.
3
 However, in general in EU law the concept child is not that 
easily defined. Due to the fact that no consistency has been used when the 
rights of the child has been legislated, and also because it has been in the 
hands of CJEU to interpret what the concept child means in EU law. To 
illustrate some differences occurring in EU law following legal instruments 
may be mentioned.  
For instance in Directive 94/33/EC on the protection of young people at 
work regulates under what conditions the child is allowed to work and be 
employed in a host Member State. Pursuant Article 2(1) a child is someone 
who is under the age of eighteen, and pursuant Article 3(b) defined as a 
person who is under the age of fifteen or still subject to compulsory-school 
in accordance to the laws in the Member State. If the child is fifteen and not 
subject to compulsory school on the other hand, the person shall be seen as 
an adolescent.
4
  
In the reading of this quite new secondary EU legislation the definition of 
the concept child is almost identical with the definition in CRC. Despite that 
a drastic difference occur when entering into a reading of Directive 2004/38 
on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States and Article 2(2)(c) 
where the concept child is written as both an age-based construction and a 
construction which depends on the child’s dependency in relation to a 
parent.
5
 Article 2(2)(c) states the following ‘the direct descendants who are 
                                                 
1
 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNTS, vol. 1577, p.3. See 
Article 1.   
2
 See for example, European Commission, Communication from the Commission: Towards 
an EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child, COM(2006) 367, The Stockholm strategy – 
Building a Europe for and with children (2009-2011) and The Monaco strategy, Council of 
Europe Strategy for the Rights of the Child (2012-2015), CM(2011)171 final. 
3
De Schutter, O., with assistance of Van Goethem V., Commentary of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Network of independent experts on 
Fundamental Rights, 2006), p 210. 
4
 Directive 24/33/EC of 22 June 1994 on the protection of young people at work, OJ L 216, 
20/08/1994. 
5
 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing 
Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 
90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, OJ L 158, 30/04/2004. 
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under the age of 21 or are dependants’. The concept dependency is not 
defined further in the Directive. CJEU has interpreted the concept dependent 
child in Reyes though, and held that a situation of real dependency for the 
Article to apply must exist. The EU citizen shall for a longer period of time 
on a regular basis paid support to the child.
6
  
 
Furthermore, the concept child has not been defined in the Brussels II-
Regulation. The definition will in the dispute when the Regulation applies 
depend on how the national laws define a child.
7
 In Article 24 CRF the 
rights of the child consists of two concepts.
8
 The first concept assumes that 
the child is someone whose well-being needs protection. The second 
concept considers the child to be an individual, which has a right to be part 
of decisions that concerns the child and to have the right to be in contact 
with both the parents.
9
 However due to the fact that children are of varied 
age and maturity and not always best suited to take decisions that is in their 
best interest themselves. The concept provides that the child’s interest is 
balanced against the child’s age and maturity.10    
1.1 Purpose 
The aim of this thesis is to map out child cases in EU law of relevance for 
the purpose of detecting what meaning CJEU has given the rights of the 
child in EU law. Through an examination of the case law of CJEU in cases 
concerning children I will seek to capture the essence of what may be 
understood as the rights of the child in EU law. This is meant in a broad 
sense. Not only provisions addressed to children only will be examined. 
Provisions which in general terms are addressed to adults but also apply to 
children and CJEU has given a certain interpretation due to the fact that the 
addressed is a child, will also be examined.      
 
Exploring a certain amount of cases, which extends over different legal 
fields in EU law, will make it possible to detect different patterns as well. 
With patterns I mean a group of cases that follow upon each other fitting 
into a certain legal frame inherent in the law or in principles developed by 
CJEU.  Patterns that will reveal what the rights of the child mean in EU law, 
which may appear in one field but not in another, or patterns, which appears 
in two fields but not in a third or patterns, which partly overlaps from one 
field into another. Patterns that will uncover and reveal what meaning CJEU 
has given children’s rights in EU law.   
 
                                                 
6
 Case C-423/12 Flora May Reyes v Migrationsverket [2014] I-0000, paras 20-25. 
7
 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgements in matrimonial matters and of parental 
responsibility, OJ L 338, 23.12,2003. 
8
 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ 2010 C83/02. 
9
 Stalford, H., Children and the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability 
(Kluwer Law International, Netherlands, 2012) pp 22-25. 
10
 Mak, C., Children’s Rights in EU Law (Center for the Study of European Contract Law 
Working Paper Series, No. 2013-08) p 3. 
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Furthermore, the purpose is therefore also to detect the legal fields in which 
the child cases appear. To make it possible making comparisons between 
the different detected legal fields, and put the case law I am using into 
context. Furthermore the purpose is also to highlight case law in which 
CJEU has used Article 24 in the CFR, to interpret other EU law.  
 
The problematic with children’s rights in EU law is that the legal system 
does not provide a consist system of rights. They show up here and there 
and speaking of them as the children’s rights, the expectations raises that all 
children will receive same rights which provide them equal benefits just 
because they are children. The issue though is that, due to the fact that not 
all individuals come under the influence of EU law, or they do but doesn’t 
fulfil the requirement for a certain provision to apply the system is not 
coherent. To uncover the element determining when a right applies to a 
child it will be possible to elaborate on what more precisely the rights of the 
child in EU law are. In the light of this the main question in this thesis is: 
What meaning has CJEU given children’s rights in EU law? While 
evaluating that also following two sub questions will be used: Are the rights 
of the child differently interpreted by CJEU depending on the interest they 
are balanced against? Does the right of the child or the non-existence of the 
rights of the child raise any problematic issues in EU law?     
1.2 Delimitation 
The focus for my research will extend over three fields of EU law namely 
free movement of workers and their family members, free movement of 
persons in this case children and their primary carers, family law regarding 
parental responsibility and unaccompanied minors seeking asylum. The last 
two I treat together as child protection measures in EU law. Dealing with 
these quite broad areas of law themselves in one thesis is an ambitious 
project. Therefor following delimitations are important to set out and 
highlight to keep the writing of the thesis within reasonable boundaries.  
 
The first delimitation is made concerning social benefits such as childcare 
allowance, maternity allowance etc. The case law regarding social benefits 
of different forms awarded to workers are not relevant for the writing of this 
thesis. They may be argued to deal with children’s rights indirectly and I 
will deal with the children’s rights directly.  
 
The second delimitation is made in regard to civil statuses. There are Cases 
dealing with the subject such as Garcia Avello
11
 and Grunkin-Paul 
12
 that 
concerns children. I aim to look at rights of the child that someone have 
because the individual is a child. These Cases does not fit into my thesis 
because I made the distinction that civil status is fundamentally something 
                                                 
11
 Case C-148/02 Carlos Garcia Avello v Belgian State [2003] I-11613. 
12
 Case C-353/06 Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul [2008] I-07639. 
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you have or do not have. According to the national laws of the Member 
State, you were born into or have been naturalised into or received through 
marriage or through an adoption the civil status. When the discrimination 
occurred in the mentioned Cases it was not because the individuals were 
children but rather because they held a certain civil status a certain surname 
which they had acquired under the national laws in the Member State they 
were also a national.          
 
The third delimitation is made in regard to Decision no 1/80 of the 
association council of 19 September 1980 on the development of the 
association, the so-called Ankara agreement.
13
 The agreement is concluded 
between EU and Turkey, and allows Turkish workers to reside and work 
within the Union under similar conditions as Union workers and their family 
members in Regulation 1612/68 on free movement for workers. I did not 
want to include Cases that had been interpreted pursuant Decision 1/80 
since they do not encompass whole EU.  
 
The fourth delimitation is made in regard to the young workers directive, 
Directive 94/33/EC young workers of 22 June 1994 on the protection of 
young people at work.
14
 This is not a real delimitation since there does not 
exists any cases of relevance in that matter. However, it is of relevance to 
mention since such cases seem to have brought light to what is the child’s 
right in EU law.  
 
The fifth delimitation is made concerning child protection measures that 
have been introduced in EU law since the 1990’s. These measures vary from 
policy decisions, legislative instruments, to different projects to make 
Europe a more child friendly place free from violence, abuse and 
exploitation of children.
15
 This work within EU to protect children is 
excluded from the writing of this thesis. Focus will instead be kept on the 
legislative child protection instrument Brussels II-Regulation and protection 
of unaccompanied minors in Dublin I-Regulation.  
                                                 
13
 Decision no 1/80 of the association council of 19 September 1980 on the development of 
the association, not published in OJ. 
14
 Directive 24/33 of 22 June 1994 on the protection of young people at work, OJ L 216, 
20/08/1994. 
15
 See for instance, Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, 
replace the previous Council Framework consisting of Decision 2004/68/JHA .This 
Directive shall further be complementary to Directive 2011/36/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in 
human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 
2002/629/JHA ( 1 ), as some victims of human trafficking have also been child victims of 
sexual abuse or sexual exploitation.  
The Daphne program decision 293/2000/EC taken by the Commission and European 
Parliament consists of measures to combat sexual exploitation and violence against 
children. The Daphne program has since 2000 been developed into three programs Daphne 
program I (2000), (2004-2008) II extended to EFTA/EEA and Candidate countries, and 
(2007-2013) III add a high level of health protection into the program. 
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The fifth delimitation is made in regard to the use of the case law in 
Brussels II-Regulation. These Cases deals with rather complicated 
jurisdictional issues, the presentation and argumentation regarding these 
Cases will therefore not be as thorough, as if this thesis had solely revolved 
around private international law and main focus is kept on the use of the 
best interest of the child within the Cases brought up as well as references 
made to Article 24 on the rights of the child in CFR.  
 
Furthermore it may be highlighted that of relevance for children’s rights in 
EU law is inter alia the generic rights contained in the CRF, such as Article 
20 CFR which provides that everyone is equal before law, Article 3(2) CFR 
that every person has a right to integrity, Article 4 CFR that torture and 
other degrading treatment is prohibited, Article 5(1) and (3) CFR that 
slavery, forced labour and trafficking are prohibited, Article 7 CFR that 
everyone has the right to respect for their family life. Some provisions are 
even more child specific such as Article 14 CFR the right to education, 
Article 32 CFR prohibition of exploitation and safeguarding of health on the 
internal market and Article 21 CFR the prohibition of discrimination.
16
 
However as a sixth delimitation all provisions relevant for children 
contained in CFR will be excluded from the writing of this thesis with the 
exception of Article 24 CFR the rights of the child and to some extent also 
Article 7 the right to family life, which are put into focus. 
1.3 Methology and Material 
The used method is primarily an analysis of cases which concern children 
and therefor their rights as a child under EU law. Some provisions are 
addressed directly to children; others are addressed to anyone who is an EU 
citizen. Differences appearing when the latter type of provision applies to a 
child and CJEU interpret that provision on a child, then in this thesis that 
interpretation is considered to stipulate a right of the child. My thesis will 
show that there are patterns in EU law, in which the child cases appear. 
These patterns primarily extend over three fields of law namely free 
movement of workers, EU citizenship and child protection measures. 
 
The first legal field within in this thesis refers to children’s rights under 
worker’s rights in EU law and scholars speak of as a paradigm called 
instrumentalism, the second legal field is EU citizenship introduced through 
the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, which is spoken of as a paradigm 
referable to individualism. The third legal field is child protection, which 
appeared with the increased attention directed towards the negative side 
effects of more open boundaries between the Member States and is called 
protectionism.
 17 
Some scholars also suggest a fourth paradigm namely the 
                                                 
16
 Ruxton, S., What about us? Children’s Rights in the European Union, next step 
(European Children’s Network, Brussels, 2005) p 21. 
17
 See McGlynn, C., Families and the Euroapean Union Law, Politics and Pluralism 
(Cambridge University Press, UK, 2006) Ch 2, 3 and 5, see also Stalford, H., Children and 
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CFR.
18
 However, I consider the CFR to be essentially linked to the other 
paradigms due to the mere fact that it is a codification of already existing 
general principles in the form of fundamental rights that to some extent was 
used prior the adoption of CFR, and which only apply when EU law applies.  
 
Nevertheless, since the CFR do have an influential part in EU law I will deal 
with it in what may be called a quasi-paradigm. Further, I have sorted in the 
cases under respectively legal field and strived after to find out how the 
child cases relates to each other within each field.  To gain knowledge in 
how children’s rights in EU law is constructed and designed by CJEU. I 
have also investigated how CJEU is connecting the rights of the child in EU 
law to any fundamental right, such as the rights of the child in the CFR or 
the right to family life in the CFR. In addition, the input from the AG in 
some cases has also been of relevance to bring up for the purpose of a more 
illuminated discussion.  
 
Driven by the conviction that to understand the used children’s rights cases 
the context in which they appear must also be understood.  Therefore 
alongside the studies of these children’s right cases, I have also researched 
the doctrine describing the development of EU law concerning the child, the 
development of EU as a whole and doctrine targeting specific problematic 
appearing in relation to the Cases brought up in this thesis. Substantially, I 
have worked in four legal frameworks, each one of them presented here 
below.   
1.3.1 Legal framework of children’s rights under workers 
rights 
The relevant provisions in the child cases concerning worker´s children are 
contained in the free movement of workers in Article 45 TFEU
19
, and 
Regulation 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the 
Community.
20
 Regulation 1612/68 is a development of the rights contained 
in Article 45 TFEU free movement of workers. The purpose with 
Regulation 1612/68 is to ensure that workers enjoy equal treatment in the 
                                                                                                                            
the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability (Kluwer Law International, 
Netherlands, 2012) pp 47-50. 
18
 See for instance McGlynn, C., Rights for Children?: The Potential Impact of the 
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, (European Public Law, Kluwer Law 
International, 2002), It must be noted though, that this writing was made before CFR 
became legally binding and CJEU had settled the scope of application of CFR. However, 
within the CFR limits the child’s right contained in the CFR may be considered a right 
which do provide a measure, which makes it possible to consider the interest of the child in 
a more appropriate manner. Due to the fact that the child is acknowledged as an individual 
of a specific age and maturity and whose well-being must be considered when establishing 
what the interest in need of protection is. See the discussion in Stalford, H., Children and 
the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability (Kluwer Law International, 
Netherlands, 2012) pp 43-44. 
19
 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ 2010 
C83/10. 
20
 Regulation (EEC) 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement 
for workers within the Community, OJ L 257, 19/10/1968. 
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Member State they work in. Regarding the child as a family member of the 
worker, more specifically Article 12 in Regulation 1612/68 that provides the 
child has a right to education on equal terms as nationals is of great 
importance for the writing of this thesis and in answering what the right of 
the child in EU law mean. To some extent, Article 7(2) provides the child 
equal rights to certain social benefits as the worker, such as study finances.   
1.3.2 Legal framework of children’s rights as an EU 
citizenship right 
In regard to the child cases appearing within the field of free movement of 
persons and relevant for this thesis to mention is Article 20 and 21 TFEU 
also referred to as EU citizenship. According to Article 20(1) TFEU the 
holder of an EU citizenship is ‘every person holding the nationality of a 
Member State shall be a citizen of the Union’.21 The status pursuant Article 
21(1) TFEU entitles ‘every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the member states’. To the status are 
awards, rights and obligations as well as limitations set out in the Treaty and 
measures intended to give effect to the Treaty. Such a measure in secondary 
law is Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their 
family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States
22
. Of relevance is also Directive 2003/86 on the right to 
family reunification
23
. The Directive provides that third-country nationals 
may be reunified with their family members under certain conditions while 
the sponsor is residing in EU. This legal framework deals with children’s 
rights as a right to free movement of EU citizens.      
1.3.3 Legal framework of children’s rights as a mean to 
protect 
The child cases that has been used within the field of child protection is 
attributable to the interpretation of the Council Regulation (EC) No 
2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgements in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental 
responsibility.
24
 The Regulation is known under the name Brussels II-
Regulation and determines the jurisdiction of national courts in family-law 
matters in cross-border situations. In particular are following Articles 
relevant to be familiar with. Article 8 ‘the courts of a Member State shall 
have jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility over a child who is 
habitual resident in that Member State’. Article 20 provide that courts may 
                                                 
21
 See also Article 9 TEU, which inter alia states ‘Every national of a Member State shall 
be a citizen of the Union’. 
22
 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States, OJ L 158, 30/04/2004.  
23
 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, 
OJ L 251, 03/10/2003.  
24
 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in matrimonial matters and of parental 
responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, OJ L 338, 23.12,2003. 
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take protective provisional measures in urgent cases, Article 21 states that 
judgements shall be recognised that falls within the scope of Brussels II-
Regulation without any special procedure, and Article 42 that Member 
States shall order the return of children in the case an recognised and 
enforceable judgement is issued with such an certificate. In the application 
of the Brussels II-Regulation regarding child abduction also Hauge 
Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction is used to 
settle disputes regarding unlawfully abducted children.
25
 Of particular 
interest to this regard is Article 13(b) which states that ‘the return of the 
child shall during the circumstance the child would be exposed to physical 
or psychological harm or an otherwise intolerable situation’, not be returned 
pursuant Article 13.  
 
Also relevant for this thesis to bring up is Council Regulation (EC) No 
343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the 
Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in 
one of the Member States by a third-country national, which is applied in 
the child case MA
26
 regarding unaccompanied minors. The Regulation 
called the Dublin-I Regulation requires Member States to examine asylum 
applications of individuals seeking protection under the Geneva Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees
27
. The Dublin I-Regulation creates a 
transit system within the Union. If an asylum seeker have first landed in one 
Member State and seeks asylum in another, the last Member State may 
deport the asylum seeker to the first Member State.  
Relevant provisions in Dublin-I for this thesis are Article 5(2) ‘first lodged 
his application’ and Article (6) ‘has lodged his or her application’.28 
1.3.4 Legal framework of children’s rights in CFR 
For the purpose of establishing the boundaries concerning the applicability 
of the CFR and indirectly Article 24 ‘the right of the child’, following 
provisions will be discussed, Article 51 CFR stipulates the scope of the 
CFR, Article 6 TEU
29
 that recognises that the Charter has same legal value 
as the Treaties and Article 52(7) states that ‘explanations drawn up as a way 
of providing guidance in the interpretation of this Charter shall be given due 
regard by the courts of the Union and of the Member States’. Further, a 
more thorough examination of Article 24 CRF will follow. The provision 
states essentially three things. Firstly, the well-being of the child must be 
protected. Furthermore, the child shall have the right to express his or her 
                                                 
25
 Hauge Convention of 25 October 1980 on the civil aspects of international child 
abduction, UNTS, vol. 1343, p.89. 
26
 Case C-648/11 MA and Others [2013] I-0000. 
27
 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July1951. UNTS, vol. 189, 
p.137. 
28
 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum 
application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national, OJ L. 50/1-
50/10; 25.2.2003.  
29 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, OJ 2010 C83/01.  
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views in matters that concerns the child. Secondly, the child’s best interest 
shall be of primary consideration in actions taken which concerns them by 
public authority or private institutions. Thirdly, children have the right to 
maintain contact with both their parents on a regular basis as long as this is 
not against their best interest.  
1.4 Disposition 
I have divided this thesis into five parts. The first part deals with children’s 
rights under worker’s rights. Within in this legal field the child receives 
derived rights from the worker to reside with the worker as a family 
member. While the child resides with the worker also a right to education is 
acquired. The section commences with a short introduction describing the 
legal field in large, in the way scholars have described it as being 
instrumentalism. This description of context then is followed by a case law 
analysis, which is focused on finding the answer to what meaning CJEU has 
given children’s rights within this specific field of EU law.  
 
The second part of this thesis addresses the legal filed revolved around EU 
citizenship, which may be referred to as individualistic rights of the child, 
since the EU citizenship gives the child a free standing right. A brief 
presentation of this individualism paradigm is followed by an additional 
case law analysis of what meaning CJEU has given to the rights of the child 
within this field of EU law. 
 
The third part of this thesis addresses children’s rights within the field of 
child protection and what may be referred to as a protectionism paradigm. A 
short general description concerning the increased work regarding child 
protection in EU and some problematic that has occurred when adopting the 
Brussels II-Regulation will be brought up. This is followed by the case law 
analysis that is divided into four parts namely abducted children, legally 
moved children, vulnerable children that are being placed at foster homes 
and institutions and last unaccompanied minors and the application of 
Dublin I-Regulation.  
 
The fourth part deals with the rights of the child in the CFR. First I will 
establish when the CFR applies by determining its scope, and then examine 
how Article 24 in the CFR has been applied by CJEU by bringing up 
relevant case law for that purpose.  
 
In the fifth part of this thesis, I will finally draw the conclusion concerning 
the chosen question namely what meaning CJEU has given children’s rights 
in EU law. Inhere I conclude what meaning the children’s rights has been 
given by the CJEU in each legal field following upon each other in the order 
set out in the thesis. In these conclusions I also have given an answer to sub 
question two: Are the rights of the child differently interpreted by CJEU 
depending on the interest they are balanced against? Lastly I will also 
provide a separate answer to the third question: Does the right of the child 
 15 
or the non-existence of the rights of the child raise any problematic issues in 
EU law?  
 16 
2 INSTRUMENTALISM 
Since late 1960’s children became part of EU legislation with the adoption 
of Regulation 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the 
Community. Children as a legal subject became visible in EU law as family 
members to workers when they followed along with their parents within 
EU.
30
 The objective in Regulation 1612/68 was and still is to abolish 
discrimination of workers in regard to nationals in the Member State were 
the worker is established. Initially the underlying objective was also to 
encourage free movement of workers within EU for the purpose of 
increasing productivity on the internal market. If the worker was prevented 
from bringing along the family when moving or not being offered to live 
under dignified circumstances the worker would be prevented from moving. 
Thereto, the worker and the workers family members should be able to live 
under best possible conditions, and not be prevented from increasing their 
standard of living. 
31
 To remove the mentioned hindrance from the free 
movement would inspire workers to move and this could solve the problem 
of high unemployment at one place within EU and the lack of workers at 
another place where they were needed. To allocate workers would thus 
increase the productivity on the internal market and also provide for better 
living conditions for workers and their families.
32
  
 
In this context of free movement of workers, children received rights under 
the worker when moving along as family members to the worker. This type 
of legislation sees the individual as a mean to an end and may be called 
instrumentalism. It seeks to ensure that the productivity of the market 
increases, and the worker is the mean to accomplish this while the family is 
used as an encouragement for the worker to move so that the worker can 
become productive.
33
 The rights of the worker as well as the rights of the 
child was granted through the financial interest of the economic actor in a 
capital driven logic were the child was the mean to motivate the worker to 
move, and the worker was used as a mean to increase the production on the 
internal market.
34
 In a way the worker and the family member or the child to 
the worker more precisely sits in the same boat so to speak.  
 
In regard to the rights of the child Stalford explains however that the 
relationship between the rights of the child is dependent upon the right of 
the workers right. The child right is not free standing and only derived from 
the workers right. The workers right is based on the premise that the worker 
                                                 
30
 Stalford, H., Children and the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability 
(Kluwer Law International, Netherlands, 2012) p 16. 
31
 See Preamble of Regulation 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the 
Community , OJ L 257, 19/10/1968. 
32
 Barnard, C., The Substantive Law of The EU; The four freedoms (University Press 
Oxford, UK, 2013) p 273.  
33
 McGlynn, C., Families and the Euroapean Union Law, Politics and Pluralism 
(Cambridge University Press, UK, 2006) p 56 and p 67. 
34
 Ibid, pp 46-47. 
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is economically active in the host Member State and it is when that premise 
is fulfilled that the child has a derived right coming from the workers right. 
In ‘Children and the European Union: rights, welfare and accountability’ 
Stalford put it like this to quote:  
 
‘This body of law has been heavily criticised for its instrumental approach insofar as 
it endowed children with merely ‘parasitic rights’ that where highly dependent on 
and vulnerable to decisions of their parents’.35  
 
What Stalford meant is that if the child had rights they would perish as soon 
as the parent decided to move again.
36
 However, CJEU has been quite 
insistent in ensuring that at least when the child has received a right to 
education. That the child shall not be deprived of that right as will be 
discussed in the case law analysis. Even if the CJEU has ensured that the 
child’s right is not merely parasitic the argument as such is still valid 
though. At least for the purpose to illustrate that the child’s right is not a 
free standing right to begin with, the parable may be used to explain that the 
right the child have is dependent upon the right of the worker who must 
work for the child to receive the right in the first place. On the other side 
Stalford is right that the child’s right will be more vulnerable than the 
parents, since the child most likely will accompany the parent if the parent 
decides to move. Nevertheless, how families plan their lives are not for the 
EU legislator to become involved in.     
 
The fact that the child’s right is built upon this premise of only being a 
derived right may be explained by two reasons. This has to do with how the 
creation of EU law and why it took form, the initial objective was to create a 
common market to prevent the outburst of war again in Europe. The early 
idea simply started with the thought that workers should be able to move so 
that full use could be made of the workforce in Europe. Then the rights of 
the workers commenced to take form and develop, from that first seed 
planted.
37
   
 
The second reason is that current laws in one era of time are a reflection of 
the norms prevailing in the society at that time. The family norms in the late 
1960’s were conservative. The family consisted of the married couple a man 
and a woman, and built upon the presumption of the existence of the 
hierarchy between the husband and wife, wife and children. The father was 
the breadwinner, and the mother the primary carer of the children, the 
children a part of this family unit.
38
 
                                                 
35
 Stalford, H., Children and the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability 
(Kluwer Law International, Netherlands, 2012) p 16.   
36
 Compare with Advocate General Opinion Darmon in Case C-389/87 G. B. C. 
Echternach and A. Moritz v Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen [1989] I-00723, to 
that regard see text related to footnote 59, bellow in this thesis. 
37
 Craig, P., & De Burúrca, G., The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press, UK, 
2011) p 16. 
38
 McGlynn, C., Families and the Euroapean Union Law, Politics and Pluralism 
(Cambridge University Press, UK, 2006) p 26-27. 
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2.1 The childs right to education in Article 12 
Regulation 1612/68 
In one of the early cases Casagrande
39
 Article 12 in Regulation 1612/68, 
which states that the workers child has the right to education in the host 
Member State under equal conditions as the children of the nationals, was 
interpreted by CJEU. Essentially the question concerned if the provision 
contained the principle of non-discrimination, and if that was the case, to 
what extent that principle should apply. Did it prohibit more than just the 
discrimination concerning the admission to education or should the 
application reach further. The claimant was a child to a deceased worker 
whom was living with his mother and claimed that he had a right to 
education granted under Article 12 in Regulation 1612/68. The family was 
Italian nationals and the child had lived with the worker in Germany where 
he had attended secondary school for the school year 1971/1972. He 
claimed to be entitled ‘educational grant’ on equal terms as German students 
since he fulfilled the national provisions which permitting educational grant 
to German children.
40
  
 
CJEU held that Article 12 obliged Member States to provide education to 
children of workers whom had or was having an employment within the 
territory of the Member State. Furthermore, the Member State had to take all 
efforts in regard to ensuring that these children under the best possible 
circumstances was able to participate in education in the Member State. 
CJEU further held that the objective of Regulation 1612/68 is to eliminate 
obstacles to the free movement of workers and their family members 
exercising their right to free movement in accordance with objective 
standards in freedom and dignity.
41
 If the child to the worker would benefit 
from the education given in the host Member State, they had to be able to do 
so under equal conditions as the children of nationals in the host Member 
State, and rely on the national provisions, which provided the right to 
receive educational grant.  
 
Not only should the children of workers have the right to attend school in 
the host Member State they should also be encourage by being provided 
same possibilities as children of nationals. CJEU held namely that Article 
12 did not only refer to the admission, but also to general measures intended 
to facilitate educational attendance of children of workers as well. They 
should also be offered to attend their education under the same conditions as 
children of nationals in the host Member State.
42
 The reasoning behind the 
broad interpretation of Article 12 is partly found in AG Warner’s Opinion. 
He points out that Article 12 must have a broad interpretation since the 
purpose with it is to integrate children of migrant workers into the society in 
                                                 
39
 Case C-9/74 Office national des pensions v Emilio Di Crescenzo and Angela 
Casagrande, widow of Romeo Barel [1992] I-03851. 
40
 Ibid, paras 1-2.  
41
 Ibid, para 4. 
42
 Ibid, paras 5-9. 
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the host Member State. Due to this, children of workers shall have access to 
all advantages provided to children of nationals.
 43
 CJEU ensured that the 
workers child should have equal rights to education as the children of 
nationals under the national laws of the Member State. Important to hold in 
mind also is that the national laws may concern how the education is 
organised in the Member State. However, the rights of national children 
concerning education within the Member State were the child of the worker 
is present shall reflect back on the workers child when the principle of equal 
treatment is applied.   
 
A similar question arose in Alaimo a student and daughter to an Italian 
worker working in France, studied at the Collège d’Enseignement.44 She 
was awarded study finances concerning that education, but changed school 
when she the second year was not accepted to continue her studies there. 
Enrolling at Ècole Delegue instead, only being able to claim grant from the 
department instead of the state, she was refused grant on the ground that she 
was not a French student and could therefore not receive financial aid.
45
  
 
CJEU confirmed Casagrande in Alaimo by stating that not only the 
admission to an education fell within the scope of application but also the 
education itself, and stated that the Member States must treat children of 
workers equal to children of nationals in the host Member State. The child 
to a migrant worker therefore shall have the same benefits regarding 
educational grants as children of the host Member State without any 
distinction concerning whether the grant is local or provided by the state.
46
 
Accordingly, no distinction is allowed within the sector of financing student 
grant within the Member State. The Member States may not circumvent the 
obligation to treat the workers children equal to children of nationals in 
respect of granting study finances. If Member States only were obliged to 
grant study finances under the responsibility of the state, the granting of 
study finances to education, which the Member State wished only nationals 
to attain could be allocated to other sectors than the state. The outcome of 
the judgement means for the child’s right to education that it also entails the 
right to acquire study grant under equal conditions as children of nationals. 
 
The right to study grant derived from Article 12 and Article 7(2) in 
Regulation 1612/68 was put to the ultimate test in Di Leo
47
 and Bernini
48
.  
Concerning the application of Article 7(2) which states that the worker 
‘shall enjoy the same social and tax advantages as national workers’ CJEU 
held that maintenance for study finances falls within the scope of being a 
social advantage, which also the child enjoys if the worker enjoys it. Being 
                                                 
43
 Opinion of Advocate General Warner in Case C-9/74 Office national des pensions v 
Emilio Di Crescenzo and Angela Casagrande, widow of Rome Barel, delivered on 11 June 
1974. 
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 Case C-68/74 Angelo Alaimo v Préfet du Rhône [1975] I-00051. 
45
 Ibid, para 2. 
46
 Ibid, para 5. 
47
 Case C-308/89 Carmina di Leo v Land Berlin [1990] I-04185. 
48
 Case C-3/90 M. J. E. Bernini v Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen [1992] I-
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in need of support by the parent is considered to be dependent upon the 
parent, which means that the child fulfils the requirement of being a child to 
a worker for the purpose of applying Regulation 1612/68. After settling who 
could be considered a worker and thereby who could be considered a child 
to a worker CJEU in essences asked the question in both Di Leo and Bernini 
whether the host Member State could oppose to grant study finances to a 
workers child who wanted to pursue the education in another Member State.  
 
Miss Di Leo, an Italian national and daughter to an Italian worker in 
Germany, wanted to pursue studies in medicine in Italy and applied for 
educational grant in Germany. Mrs Bernini also a child to an Italian worker 
had lived in the Netherlands were her father worked. She wanted to move to 
Italy to pursue her education in architecture and applied for study finances 
in the Netherlands.
49
 Germany refused to grant Mrs Di Leo study finances 
on the ground that she was a child to a worker and did not qualify. 
Netherlands refused Mrs Bernini on the ground that she had to be resident in 
the Netherlands in order to qualify for study grant. CJEU held in Di Leo that 
Article 12 in Regulation 1612/68 did not contain any restriction in regard to 
the place were the child pursued the education, and that the principle of 
equal treatment did not allow any restrictions in regard to the children of 
workers.
50
 Bernini was a pure confirmation of Di Leo, but to a certain 
degree clarified more precisely that the Member States were not allowed to 
impose an extra condition on the right to study grant in regard to the child of 
the worker in the form of requiring them to be resident in the host Member 
State while pursuing the education. For the rights of the child to education 
to apply when the child wants to pursue the studies abroad this meant that, 
the child has to be considered dependent upon the parent.
51
 When this 
criterion is fulfilled the child has a right to be granted study finances under 
equal terms as children of nationals pursuing studies abroad. The Member 
State is not allowed to impose an extra condition making it practically 
impossible for the child to make use of the right under equal terms as 
children of nationals in the host Member State. 
 
Both Mrs Di Leo and Mrs Bernini had lived as children of a worker in the 
host Member State, and been part of the educational system in the host 
Member State. In Meeusen the question took on a new dimension.
52
 
Netherlands refused to grant study finances to Mrs Meeusen a Belgian child 
of a frontier worker living in Belgium. Mrs Meeusen considered herself to 
have been discriminated against and the question if she had a right to study 
finances went up to the CJEU.
53
 Could a child to a frontier worker rely on 
Article 7(2) in Regulation 1612/68 and be granted study finances even if the 
child never had lived nor had the worker in the host Member State. CJEU 
                                                 
49
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50
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stressed that the preamble made it clear that no discrimination concerning 
frontier workers and their family members are allowed.  Further a dependent 
child of a frontier worker not resident in the host Member State may rely on 
Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1612/68 and acquire study finance while 
pursuing the education in another Member State, then the host Member 
State. To impose the condition that the child must be resident in the host 
Member State would be discriminatory. The condition the child must fulfil 
is to have lived with the parent during the time the parent have been a 
worker.
54
 It is apparent that CJEU apply the principle of equal treatment in a 
consistent manner on the right to be granted study finances also in relation 
to children of frontier workers. That means that all children that have 
acquired the derived right of being a child of a worker shall have the right 
be granted study finances under equal conditions as children of nationals in 
the host Member State.  
2.2 The concept workers influence on Article 
12 Regulation 1612/68 
Who may be considered a worker under EU law also became relevant in 
relation to answering the question, who may be considered to be a child to a 
worker and have a right to education under Article 12 of Regulation 
1612/68. In Mencarelli a commissioner was considered a worker and the 
daughter could therefore be considered a child of a worker. Therefor having 
a right to additional financial support for her accommodating at the school 
she was attending in the host Member State on equal terms as children of 
nationals. 
55
 The concept worker was examined in Echternacht and Moritz 
to settle whether Regulation 1612/68 could apply to the workers children in 
question. If they could have a right under Article 12 the Regulation 1612/68 
conferring them a right to education. Netherlands had refused two foreign 
students, children of German nationals, grants for their university studies.
 56
  
Echternachts father worked for an international organization in the 
Netherlands and was not regarded to be a worker. The father of Moritz’s on 
the other side was considered to have ceased being a worker and therefore 
could Moritz’s not be considered a child of a worker.57  
 
CJEU considered however that someone having a post in an international 
organization situated in a host Member State did fall within in the concept 
of being a worker and Regulation 1612/68 supported by Article 48(1) and 
(2) of the Treaty therefor applied. The other question concerned if 
Regulation 1612/68 continued to apply to a child after that the worker had 
ceased to work in the host Member State. CJEU held that in accordance 
                                                 
54
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55
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 Case C-389 and 390/87 G. B. C. Echternach and A. Moritz v Minister van Onderwijs en 
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with Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68, a child of a worker must be able to 
pursue his or her higher education. Further in order to be successful also be 
able to complete the education in the host Member State.
58
 If the child has 
lived in the host Member State with the worker and become installed in the 
educational system in that Member State the child has a right to finish his or 
her education.
59
  
 
AG Darmon stressed that the provision concerning the child’s right to 
complete the education could not be made conditional upon whether or not 
the parent decided to stay in the host Member State or not. That would give 
raise to situations in which families became precarious because it often was 
prone to depend on the behaviour of the father in the family, and on what he 
decided to do. If the child had received rights and strictly would depend on 
the parent’s right, which could affect the child’s right that would be contrary 
to the spirit of EU law.
60
 CJEU gave the child’s right to education a 
freestanding meaning. After that the child had received the derived right 
from the worker and become installed in the education the child had a strong 
right to education to lean back on. Once the right to education received that 
right cannot be taken from the child due to some arbitrariness in behaviour 
of a parent who suddenly wants to move somewhere else. Nevertheless it is 
likely that the child will move with the parent if the parent decides to move 
even before the education is finished in the host Member State. What is 
clear though is that the right as such makes it possible for the child to stay in 
the Member State if the parent decides to move in order to finish the 
education.  
 
In Brown the scope and limits of when the concept worker will provide the 
child a derived right to rely on Article 12 in Regulation 1612/68 was 
examined. Mr Brown was a student brought up in France that had dual 
nationality, British and French. He was seeking student allowance in the UK 
for the purpose to pursue studies in electrical engineering at the Cambridge 
University. Before pursing the courses he had taken a job at a Company in 
Belfast claiming it to be ‘pre-university industrial training’ part of the 
university studies.
61
 Mr Brown claimed himself to be a child of a worker 
since his parent had been working and residing in the UK before he was 
born. Mr Brown had never had the status of being a family member of a 
worker though. Despite this the question was could he still benefit from 
Regulation 1612/38 and Article 12 therein.
62
 CJEU held that Mr Brown was 
not a child of a worker. Because the wording of Article 12 is clear and states 
that ‘it grants rights only of a child who has lived with his parents or either 
one of them in a Member State whilst at least one of his parents resided 
there as a worker.’ Since Mr Brown he had not resided with at least one of 
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his parents, whilst at least one of them were working in UK Regulation 
1612/68 did not apply.  For the rights of the child concerning the right to 
education in Article 12 CJEU made the provision conditional upon the child 
having resided with the worker to come in enjoyment of that right.  
2.3 The concept child in Article 12 Regulation 
1612/68 
CJEU interpreted the concept ‘child’ in Landesamt and the relevance the 
child’s age had for the right to be entitled education pursuant Article 12 in 
Regulation 1612/68.
63
 Mr Gaal was a Belgian who sought education 
allowance to continuing his University studies in the UK. His income 
consisted of an orphan allowance that he received from his deceased father. 
He was not dependent upon his mother.
64
 The application was rejected on 
the ground that he had ‘reached the age of 21 years of age and was not 
dependant on his parents’.65 The question referred to CJEU was if the 
concept of ’child’ for the purpose of Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 was 
subject to a condition of age or dependency in the same way the rights 
governed by Article 10(1) and Article 11 of Regulation 1612/68 was. The 
German Government argued that there was a close connection between 
Article 10, 11 and 12 in Regulation 1612/68 and that Article 12 therefore 
had to be interpreted restrictively.  
 
CJEU was of another opinion and held that such a view was not acceptable. 
Article 12 does not refer to either one of the other two provisions, and the 
principle of equal treatment provides that a child of a migrant worker must 
be able to complete his studies successfully. To make Article 12 subject to 
limitations such as age or the child having to be dependent upon a parent for 
the Article to apply would conflict with the letter and the spirit of that 
provision.
66
 CJEU held that the relevant conditions to look at was if the 
‘child’ had lived with his or her parents while the parent had the status of 
being a worker as had been held in Brown.
67
 CJEU reached the conclusion 
that the definition child in Article 12 was not subject to the same limitations 
as set out in Art 10 and 11 of Regulation 1612/68.
68
 According to Article 10 
the child must install him- or herself and not reached the age of 21 or still be 
dependent upon the parent.  
 
To not make Article 12 conditional upon Article 10 is logical argued AG 
Tesauro, since it is possible for the child to rely on other provisions in EU 
law to reside in the same Member State as the parents. As pointed out by the 
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child still needs to be safeguard and protected from unfair discrimination in 
relation to children in the host Member State.
69
 This means that the right of 
the child to education once it is acquired create a concept of the child that is 
not governed by the child’s age or the child being dependent upon a parent. 
Simply it means that once the child has received a right to education it 
cannot be lost. The child may rely on the right in the host Member State and 
expect equal rights to education as the child of a national in that Member 
State.   
2.4 The childs right to a primary carer in Article 
12 Regulation 1612/68 
In Landemsamt the concept child concerning the age limit in regard to 
Article 12, which had no such limit. An adult who had acquired the right 
would be able to use it. What about the circumstance of the child being a 
minor and the parent to the child ceased be a worker, or the parent a third-
country national got divorced. What would happen with the right to 
education for that minor child, and or if the minor was a third-country 
national child? In Baumbast and R the meaning of Article 12 in Regulation 
1612/68 was examined further as being a free standing right to education. In 
essence the questions boiled down to whether the minor child had a right to 
be joined by a primary carer in order to be able to continue the education?
70
  
 
The family Baumbast lived in the UK and consisted of Mr Baumbast a 
German national, Mrs Baumbast a Colombian national and their children. 
The father in Mr Baumbast a German national had ceased to work in the UK 
were he held the status worker, and joined a German company in China. His 
wife was a Colombian national and they had two children, one together a 
German and Colombian national and one from Mrs Baumbast previous 
marriage a Colombian national.
71
 The children attended school in UK and 
the family also had sufficient resources and a comprehensive sickness 
insurance in Germany.
72
 CJEU held that the right conferred from Article 12 
had to be interpreted in alignment with the principles of liberty and dignity 
enacted in the free movement. Furthermore, if the child installed in the 
education system in the host Member State would not be able to finish her 
or his education successfully, that would prevent the worker in the first 
place to exercising the free movement of work pursuant Article 45 TFEU.
73
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The acquired right to education did not cease to exist if a parent ceased to be 
a worker or got divorce from a worker.
74
 CJEU used two lines of arguments 
explaining why the child had a right to be joined by a primary carer. Firstly 
the right to education presupposed that the child could be joined by the 
parent since the child otherwise would risk being depriving of the right.
75
 
The right could not under any circumstance be made ineffective receiving a 
restrictive interpretation.
76
 Secondly the right to education had to be 
interpreted in light of the right to family life pursuant Article 8 ECHR
77
 
since the right to family life is a fundamental right recognised in EU law.
78
 
The principle of equal treatment in conjunction with the right to family life 
provided that Article 12 had to be construed in a manner which provided 
that the child could, ‘under the best possible conditions’ attend the courses 
in the host Member State. In other words that the child shall be able to finish 
the education under the same conditions as children of nationals of the host 
Member State.
79
   
 
When the child had acquired a right to education under Article 12, that 
provision also conferred a right to the primary carer of the child to reside 
with the child. The child’s right to education is in this respect rather far 
reaching. The same rules applied to the third-country national child since 
Article 10 in Regulation 1612/68 is not restricted in regard to the nationality 
of a family member.
80The meaning the CJEU gave the child’s rights to 
education was that it allows a primary carer to join the child. The child who 
is a minor shall not lose the possibility to enjoy the right to education fully. 
Regardless if the parent is a work any longer or is a third-country national 
that has got divorced the child’s right to education shall remain and the 
solution CJEU has used is to confer a derived right from the child’s right to 
education to the child’s primary carer.  
 
In Baumbast and R it was held that a child that had acquired a right to 
education had a right to be joined by a primary carer. However in Baumbast 
and R the children were joined by primary carer that had sufficient resources 
and a comprehensive sickness insurance to not become a financial burden to 
the host Member State. What would happen if the primary carer did not 
have sufficient resources when joining the child in the host Member State?  
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In the Cases of Ibrahim
81
, Texiera
82
 and Alarape and Tijani
83
 the concept 
primary carer was thoroughly examined by CJEU. The primary carer in 
Ibrahim was a Somalia national who lived in UK with her Danish husband 
and their four children were attending school. The husband lost his status as 
a worker.
84
 The couple separated and Ms Ibrahim was not self-sufficient 
depended on social assistance to cover her living expenses. She therefore 
applied for social housing assistance.
85
 She claimed to have a derived right 
to reside pursuant Article 12 in Regulation 1612/68 in UK, based on the 
circumstance that she had children attending school.
86
 The primary carer in 
Texiera was Mrs Teixiera that also lacked sufficient means, she even 
became homeless under a period. Mrs Texiera a Portuguese national had 
moved with her husband to UK where they worked. The daughter was born 
and attended school in UK but the couple divorced.
 87
 To be able to support 
herself and the daughter Mrs Texiera applied for housing assistance for 
homeless people and based her claim on the right of residence under Article 
12 of Regulation 1612/68.
88
 The daughter was at the age of fifth at the time 
of the proceedings and therefor the national court wanted to know if she 
after reaching the age of maturity still would be entitled to be joined by a 
primary carer.  
 
In Alarape and Tijani the primary carer was a third-country national mother 
a soon to be doctoral student also a third-country national.  Ms Alarape 
mother to Mr Tijani, both Nigerian nationals lived in UK. Ms Alarape had 
married a French national and Mr Tijani had attended school and had 
obtained a bachelor’s degree a master’s degree and been accepted to 
doctoral studies at the University in Edingburgh.
89
. They applied for 
residence permit but did not fulfil the five year requirement set out in 
Directive 2004/38 of having been lawfully resident in the host Member 
State. Therefore the question arose whether Ms Alarape could be considered 
a primary carer providing emotional support to Mr Tijani and if she was if 
they had to share the same household. In regard to the question if a primary 
carer could have a derived right to reside with the child without having 
sufficient resources. CJEU put child’s right to education in focus and 
confirmed the reasoning in Baumbast.
90
 The once acquired right to 
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education cannot be deprived the child and that right is an independent 
right.
91
 Article 12 may therefore not be made conditional upon the child 
having sufficient resources and a comprehensive sickness insurance in 
accordance with Article 7 in Directive 2004/38 in order to have a right to be 
joined by a primary carer. The primary carer may therefore rely solely on 
Article 12 in Regulation 1612/68.
92
  
 
In the second step taken by CJEU in Texiera that developed the concept 
primary carer further, concerned whether a child that had reached the age of 
maturity also could have a right to be joined. CJEU held that held that 
Article 12 and the rights therein was not affected by the age of maturity. 
Since Article 12 also encompasses completion of higher education.
93
 CJEU 
made the analogy to the right of financial assistance provided for in Article 
12. The age of a workers child who had acquired a right to education and 
reached the age over twenty-one, no longer dependent upon the parents still 
had a right to financial assistance.
94
 The primary carer had therefor a right to 
reside with the child after that the child reached the age a maturity, as long 
as the child was in need of the care and support from the parent to be able to 
accomplish the education. It was left to the national court though to 
establish whether that circumstance was at hand.
95
 In regard to the age and 
maturity CJEU also dealt with the question if the emotional support provide 
by the primary carer could be considered to entitle the primary carer a 
derived right to residence and also while providing this emotional support 
did the primary carer have to live in the same household as the child.
 96
   
 
CJEU held that the age did not affect the application of Article 12 and it 
encompassed higher education. CJEU never answered the question whether 
the primary carer had to live in the same household as the child though. If 
the child’s right to pursue the education and there would arise a risk that the 
child would not be successful in the studies without the primary carer after 
the age of maturity, then primary carer had a derived right to residence. This 
emerging concept of the child’s right to be joined by a primary carer meant 
that other factors then age and maturity would be decisive in determining 
whether the child had the right to be accompanied also after reaching the 
age of maturity. The cases have to read as the CJEU states that the child has 
a right to be joined also after that the child has reached the age of maturity. 
However, when passing this age limit it will be left to the national courts to 
decide whether there exists a need for the child to be joined. If a child would 
be in need of emotional support from a primary carer then the national court 
may permit that a primary carer joins the child.    
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In Czop and Punakova the question arise whether also a self-employees 
child could have a right to education and equal treatment under Article 12 in 
Regulation 1612/68, that the child’s primary carer could have a derived right 
to residence under Regulation 1612/68. 
97
 Ms Czop a self-employed mother 
of four children, a polish national had come to UK on a student visa in 2002. 
One child was born in Poland and the other three in UK. In 2006 her son 
Lukasz Czop from Poland joined the family in UK and commenced his 
education there.
 98
 Ms Czop went out of business for a period and applied 
for income support in 2008. Ms Czop’s application was rejected on the 
ground that she did not have a right to residence in UK for the purpose of 
the national Regulation regarding income support to apply.
99
 Ms Czop 
claimed that she had a derived right of residence in UK because of her self-
employment. Because as a general principle in EU law self-employment 
equated with worker. Since she had been a worker and her children became 
installed into the education system during this time they had acquired a right 
to education under Article 12 in Regulation 1612/68. Relying on the 
reasoning in Baumbast, Ibrahim and in Texiera Ms Czop claimed to therefor 
have a derived right to residence as a primary carer and therefore a right to 
social assistance benefits during the time she was unemployed.
100
  
 
CJEU stated that for the child to have a right to education the parent had to 
acquire the status worker in the host Member State.
101
 Ms Czop, nor her 
husband had been workers since they were self-employed.
102
 The fact that 
Ms Czop was Lukasz primary carer was not sufficient for her to have a 
derived right to residence.  CJEU held that the literal wording in Regulation 
1612/68 had to be observed. Pursuant Article 12 only the child of an 
employed, whom the child had resided with when the employed was 
working in the host Member State could fall within the scope of application.  
To follow the literal wording supported by both the general scheme of 
Regulation 1612/68 as well as Article 46 TFEU only employees and their 
children was encompassed by Regulation 1612/68. CJEU also held 
supported by the fact that Article 12 had been reproduced into Regulation 
492/11 governing free movement of workers in Article 46 TFEU there was 
no reason for diverging from the wording. Article 12 has a clear and precise 
wording and the Article would lose its effectiveness if it was not 
respected.
103
 Due to this, a child of a self-employed could not have a right to 
education pursuant Article 12 that a primary carer could receive a derived a 
right from.   
 
From a child’s rights perspective it appears strange that CJEU made such a 
distinct different between children of workers and children of self-employed 
workers. Both the worker and the self-employed person contribute to the 
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finances in the host Member State.
104
 The only thing that separates the 
worker who is employed and the worker who is self-employed is that, the 
self-employed worker works under the direction of him or herself. CJEU 
has held that anyone who pursues activities that are genuine and real is a 
worker. The self-employed person which on a regular basis under a certain 
time period perform tasks which are ‘genuine and real’ produces an income, 
is under the supervision of him or herself and receives remuneration from 
the income earned ought to be considered a worker.
105
 Consider that the 
objective with Regulation 1612/68 is to ensure that workers are not being 
discriminated against, as well as the purpose with Article 12 in Regulation 
1612/68 is to ensure that children of workers receives equal treatment . It is 
a rather strange conclusion to exclude the self-employed person and their 
children form the enjoyment of that right since that self-employed person 
contributes to the productivity within the host Member State.      
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3 INDIVIDUALISM 
The idea to impose the EU citizenship status as part of the Maastricht Treaty 
in 1993 was not a coincident.
106
 Not only had the idea started to flourish 
amongst scholars that to different extents envisioned a federalist EU a 
United European Union a model based on the United States in the 1970.
107
 
In addition, CJEU played an important part in the creation of the concept 
EU citizenship before it was introduced into the Maastricht Treaty. The 
CJEU dealt with issues, which arise when economically active persons on 
the internal market for example ceased to be economically active and maybe 
decided to become students.
108
 In a legal environment were provisions did 
not provide a clear cute answer and CJEU had to balance the dynamic 
creating tensions between the internal market ideology and the goal of 
integration, the EU citizenship like status emerged.  
 
According Kochenov and Plender the EU citizenship is merely a 
codification of CJEU case law, due to the prevailing continuity in the cases 
pre-Maastricht and after. It is possible to distinguish similarities between the 
quasi-like status in the pre-Maastricht Cases and in the after-Maastricht 
Cases revolving around the status of EU citizenship.
109
After the introduction 
of the EU-citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty, CJEU interpreted the 
concepts bearing in EU law first time in Baumbast were the CJEU held that 
Article 21 TFEU have direct effect.
110
 CJEU held therein that the EU 
citizenship is a fundamental status
111
, which entailed the right to reside in 
other Member States if the EU citizen could provide for himself and the 
family members in the host Member State. To have sufficient resources and 
a comprehensive sickness insurance and thereby not become a burden to the 
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social system in the host Member State enabled the EU citizen to move and 
reside without having to fulfil the requirement of being economically active 
in the host Member State as a worker.
 112
  
3.1 The childs right to free movement in Article 
21 TFEU 
CJEU then interpreted the status of EU citizenship concerning children for 
the first time in Zhu and Chen. That appears to have constituted a marriage 
between the rights interpreted in Baumbast. In that Case, both the EU 
citizenship right to free movement and the child’s right to be joined by a 
primary carer to give full effect to the right to education pursuant Article 12 
in Regulation 1612/68 were handled separately but in Zhu and Chen 
together. However, with the small adjustment concerning the right to be 
joined by a primary carer, which was used mutatis mutandis and turned into 
the right to be accompanied instead of joined when exercising free 
movement. In Zhu and Chen the principle of the child’s right to be joined by 
a primary carer overlaps from the instrumentalism paradigm into the 
individualism paradigm on free movement of EU-citizens. By joining the 
right to EU citizenship and the right to be accompanied by the primary carer 
CJEU took the steps necessary to ensure that the EU citizenship became a 
right of substance rather than a mere installation for the child. From having 
been dependent upon the worker’s right to receive rights of residence and 
the right to education and that in addition, the primary carer could come to 
rely on. The child now had a free standing right, which the parent or primary 
carer could have a derived right from. That was the outcome in Zhu and 
Chen.  
 
The child and infant Cathrine had been born in Northern Ireland by her 
mother Mrs Chen a Chinese national. Mrs Chen married to Mr Chen, 
worked for a large company in the People’s Republic of China. Mr Chen 
often travelled in his work to various Member States.
113
 Previous the birth 
of Cathrine they had one child born in China in 1998. In addition, which AG 
Tizzano stresses in her Opinion, the Chen couple already had one child and 
according to Chines policy laws regarding birth control the Couple Chen 
were prevented from having a second child in China. Mrs Chen therefor 
decided to move to the UK and give birth to her second child there. Mrs 
Chen had planned the birth of Cathrine in Belfast because she knew that 
Cathrine would acquire Irish nationality and therefore membership in the 
Union. Mrs Chen herself could benefit from this and establish herself with 
the child in the UK.
114
 It was clear that the child was dependent upon the 
mother both financially and emotionally. Because Cathrines acquired Irish 
nationality, she lost her right to become a Chines national and could not 
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visit China for more than 30 days at a time.
115
 Mrs Chen applied for 
residence permit in UK. However, the UK authority considered that Mrs 
Chen did not have a right to reside in the UK and rejected that application 
When Mrs Chen appealed the decision, the national court wanted to know if 
the infant Cathrine had a right to move and reside in UK, and If the answer 
was answered in the affirmative, would this mean that the minor child’s 
mother the primary carer would have a right to reside with the child in the 
UK?
116
 The Irish and Brittish governments argued that the situation was 
wholly internal and that EU law therefor did not apply. CJEU was of a 
different opinion. The fact that a person was born in the host Member State 
and had not exercised his or her free movement, could not sum up in the 
conclusion that the person did not come in enjoyment of rights conferred by 
EU law.
117
  
 
The UK Government was also of the opinion that Mrs Chen tried to 
‘illegally circumvent the national legislation’ due to her planning of giving 
birth to baby Cathrine in Northern Ireland were she knew that Cathrine 
would acquire Irish nationality and receive EU citizenship which Mrs Chen 
could claim to have a derived right from.
118
 CJEU held that the argument 
was irrelevant. It did not matter that Mrs Chen had planned were to give 
birth to her child. Even if that meant the child would acquire the nationality 
of the Member State. Since each Member States is free to decide whether to 
apply jus solis or jus sanguinis in accordance with international laws. In 
consideration of that, Member States are not allowed to impose an extra 
condition upon the acquired status as has been held in both Micheletti
119
 and 
Kaur
120
.
 121
  
 
Furthermore, CJEU held that the EU citizenship is a fundamental status 
according to Article 20 TFEU which encompasses every person who is a 
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national of a Member State, even an infant not able to care for herself and 
whose well-being is dependent upon a parent. The EU citizenship status 
further confers a right to its holder to reside in another Member State 
according to Article 21 TFEU. The right may be subject to limitations and 
conditions set out in secondary law. Such limitations for the EU citizen and 
their family members is primary to have sufficient resources and to be 
covered by a comprehensive sickness insurance to not become a burden on 
the social assistance system in the host Member State.
122
 In this regard, 
CJEU made no distinction between a minor child and an adult. Could the 
minor child fulfil the obligation of having sufficient resources and a 
comprehensive sickness insurance than the child had a right to residence 
pursuant Article 21 TFEU and at the time effective Directive 90/364 in the 
host Member State. Were the child’s financial resources came from had no 
significance.
123
  
 
Concerning the question whether Mrs Chen could have a derived right of 
residencies due to her position as a primary carer to Catherine  not be 
considered dependent upon Catherine for the purpose of applying Directive 
90/364. However, Catherine would not be able to rely on the free movement 
provision on her own if the mother was not allowed to reside with her. To 
not allow the parent a derived right would in the circumstances mean that 
the child’s right to residence would not be of ‘any useful effect’. In other 
words, the child would be deprived of the right to residence if the primary 
carer could not accompany the child. CJEU relied on the reasoning used in 
Baumbast in relation to Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68.
124
  
 
To conclude the primary carer of a child resident in a host Member State 
who never have exercised the right to free movement but fulfils the 
condition of having sufficient resources and a comprehensive sickness 
insurance, has a derived right to reside with the child in the host Member 
State. Because the useful effect of the right conferred to the child as an EU 
citizen to exercise the right to free movement would otherwise be deprived 
the child. Furthermore AG Tizzano stressed that it would be against the 
interest of the child, if the mother was not allowed to reside with the child in 
the host Member State. The child could not manage by her-self and to be 
abandoned by the mother for the purpose of the child being able to stay 
would not have been a reasonable solution. The denial would have gone 
against the principles set out in Article 8 concerning the right of family life 
in ECHR.
125
 CJEU did follow this line of reasoning as well when 
interpreting Article 21 TFEU, and interpreted Article 21 TFEU it in the light 
of Article 8 ECHR, even if it is a bit unclear from the sole reading of the 
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Case. However, reference was made to Baumbast and paragraphs 71 to 75 
therein, which uses this line on reasoning.   
   
The problem in claiming that the child has an independent right to residence 
is that the child still is dependent upon the parent if the right will have any 
useful effect. The child will go wherever the parent goes and the right is 
rather used under the influence of the primary carer. Still it is in the interest 
of the child that CJEU constructed the EU citizenship in regard to the child 
in this manner since there will arise situations such as this in issue when it is 
appropriate that the EU citizen child is under the enjoyment of EU law. The 
child is recognised as an individual with its own rights, add to this the 
child’s rights in the CFR the child’s right to family life in Article 7 CFR and 
the child’s best interest pursuant Article 24 (2) CFR is observed when EU 
law applies. Noteworthy is that the child’s right to residence is limited in 
regard to the child having sufficient resources and a comprehensive sickness 
insurance. Compare this with Texiera
126
, Ibrahim
127
 and Alarape and 
Tijani
128
 the conclusion can be drawn that may be read e contrario, as when 
no economic contribution has been made to the host Member State in the 
form of the worker paying taxes and make social security contributions, or 
the EU-citizen has sufficient resources and a comprehensive sickness 
insurance to not become a burden to the host Member State, then the free 
standing right will not be given any effect in EU law under the right to free 
movement in Article 21 TFEU and Article 45 TFEU. (See further under 
point 3.5 to what extent in Case C-86/12 Alopka)    
3.2 The childs right to a primary carer in Article 
21 TFEU  
To what extent could a primary carer have a derived right to residence in 
regard to an EU citizens child’s right to be accompanied. Or if the same 
thing is argued in the reverse, to what extent may a child be considered 
dependent upon the primary carer and therefor have a right to be 
accompanied by a primary carer. These questions were examined by CJEU 
in Iida.
129
  MR Iida was a Japanese national and married to a German 
national in the United States. The couple had a daughter Mia while living 
there who acquired German, American and Japanese nationality. The family 
then moved to Germany were Mr Iida was granted a residence permit under 
the national family reunification laws. He also had a full-time employment 
in Germany. The couple separated and Mr Iida’s spouse moved to Vienna 
with the daughter Mia in Austria. On a regular basis, Mr Iida held contact 
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with his daughter spending one week in Vienna to visit her and having her 
home at the weekends in Germany.  
 
Mr Iida applied for a residence card as a family member of an EU citizen. 
The national authorities rejected the application though, on the ground that 
Directive 2004/38 did not apply in the specific situation.
130
 CJEU held the 
fact that Mr Iida did not join the daughter and spouse in the other Member 
State meant that he could not benefit from Directive 2004/38 since he did 
not accompany the his EU citizen child.
131
 Since secondary legislation did 
not apply, CJEU went on to examine whether a right of residence could be 
derived from Article 20 and 21 TFEU. In that regard CJEU held that the 
right a third country national may acquire is not an autonomous right but a 
derived right based on the rights of the EU citizen to enter and reside in 
another member state.
132
 The CJEU concluded that the child who was 
accompanied by her mother in Austria was not deprived of the right to 
reside in the host Member State in accordance with the principle set out in 
Zhu and Chen, nor was she under any risk of losing her status as an EU 
citizen. Mr Iida was further seeking the right to residence in the Member 
State of origin and not in the host Member State, he had always stayed in 
the Member State of origin. CJEU held that a hypothetical link to apply EU 
law could not be created for the purpose of applying EU law.
133
 In other 
words, the situation was considered wholly internal and EU law did not 
apply.  
 
For the child’s right of free movement as an EU citizen this meant that, the 
child has a right to be accompanied in a host Member State when exercising 
the right. However, the primary carer must have his or her habitual 
residence in the Member State the child resides in to create the EU link. It is 
unclear if the primary carer must live in the same household as the child. 
Nevertheless, it is not sufficient that the primary carer visits the child even if 
it is on a regular basis in the host Member State, while the primary carer still 
resides in the Member State of origin. (Note that CJEU also interpreted if it 
was possible for Mr Iida to have a derived right solely on the basis of 
Article 7 CFR ‘the right to family life’ and Article 24 ‘the rights of the 
child’, the issue will be handled under section 5 in this thesis). 
3.3 The childs right to EU-citizenship in Article 
20 TFEU 
In most Cases the status of being an EU citizen becomes relevant first when 
the EU citizen exercises his or her right to free movement and EU law 
becomes applicable. However, in Ruiz Zambrano CJEU held that in certain 
specific circumstances EU law will apply without the activation of a cross-
border link, to prevent the circumstance of an individual risk being deprived 
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of the fundamental status of being an EU citizen. Such were the 
circumstances in Ruiz Zambrano were the possibility for the children, EU 
citizens to remain in the Member State of their origin was threatened, on the 
ground that their parents would maybe not have a derived right to residence 
there. The child’s dependency on the parent and primary carer who was a 
third-country national was in other words put into the ultimate test.
134
  
 
Mr Ruiz Zambrano and Mrs Moreno López, Colombian nationals, living in 
Belgium sought asylum due to the ongoing hostile situation in their home 
country. Mr Ruiz Zambrano and his wife had been exposed to death threats 
by private militia, witnessed assaults directed towards a brother and having 
their youngest child abducted during an entire week.
135
 Because 
international law prevented Belgium from sending them back to Colombia, 
they remained in Belgium, without work permission since the national 
authorities refused to acknowledge their right to residence. Despite this, Mr 
Ruiz Zambrano signed an employment agreement for full time work so that 
he could provide financially for his family. During the stay in Belgium Mrs 
Ruiz Zambrano gave birth to two children, Jessica and Diego. Both the 
children acquired Belgian nationality. After the second child had been born, 
the Zambrano couple lodged an application seeking the right to residence in 
Belgium as ascending relatives to Belgian nationals. 
136
 After a control by 
the national authority at the workplace of Mr Ruiz Zambrano it was detected 
that he worked there without a work permit. Mr Ruiz Zambrano was fired 
immediately without being compensated for the work he had done. He 
applied for unemployment benefits, but due to the fact that he did not have a 
work permit his application was rejected. 
 
Mr Ruiz Zambrano claimed that EU law applied to him and that he therefore 
had a direct right to rely on the Treaty. Alternatively, he considered that he 
had a right to rely on the judgment in Zhu and Chen. The judgment that 
gave the third-country primary carer of an EU citizen child, that had 
sufficient resources and a comprehensive sickness insurance, a derived right 
to reside with the minor in the Member State. Mr Ruiz Zambrano claimed 
that he fell under the exemption to not be required to have a work permit so 
that he could fulfil the requirement of having sufficient resource and his 
children’s right to residence would not be deprived of  its ‘useful effect’.137  
CJEU pointed out that according to Article 20 every person holding a 
nationality of a member State enjoys the status of being a citizen of the 
Union.
138
 Since both Jessica and Diego have Belgian nationality, they are 
citizens of the Union. Further it was empathized that Article 20 TFEU 
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‘Preclude national measures which have the effect of depriving citizens of the Union 
of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their 
status as citizens of the Union’.
139
  
 
Conclusively, to refuse to grant work permit and the right to residence of a 
third-country national parent whom the child is dependent upon would have 
that effect.
140
 For the child’s right this meant that the child whom is a 
national of a Member State, and thereby is an EU-citizen cannot be deprived 
of that right even if the parents are third-country nationals without any 
rights to reside in the Member State. To force the parents to leave the 
territory of the Member State would indirectly mean to force the child to 
leave the territory. The child that had a right to the status of EU citizenship 
would be deprived that right if the child was forced to leave the territory of 
the Member State. Therefor has the primary carer received a derived right to 
reside with the child in order for the child to enjoy the useful effect of the 
right conferred by the status EU citizenship.     
 
In O and S the circumstance in a way was similar to those in Ruiz 
Zambrano, except from the fact that the third-country national who faced 
being expelled from the Member State was a step-parent of an EU citizen 
and married to another third-country national whom had a right to reside in 
the Member State already. Mrs S a Ghana national living in Finland was 
married with a Finish national with whom she had a child. The couple 
divorced, Mrs S received custody of the child who was an EU citizen and 
was remarried to a third-country national Mr O. Mrs S and Mr O had 
together two children. Mr O applied for residence in Finland, the application 
was rejected due to the fact that he could not show that he had subsistence 
means.
141
 Since the primary carer of the child had a right to reside in the 
Member State in question there was no risk for the EU citizen child to risk 
losing the ‘genuine enjoyment of substance of rights’ in accordance with the 
principle set out in Ruiz Zambrano. Nevertheless, since both parents in 
contrast to Dereci was third-country nationals CJEU could apply Directive 
2003/86 on family reunification, which they could not in Dereci.
142
 (See to 
what effect under heading 5.2 in this thesis and further discussion what this 
meant for the rights of the child in EU law). 
 
In ‘The Concept of EU citizenship in the case law of the ECJ’ Leanarts 
stresses that a conjunct reading of Ruiz Zambrano, McCharty
143
 and 
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Dereci
144
 means that for the concept of ‘deprivation’ which has to be at 
hand if Article 20 TFEU shall apply to the situation, must in its nature force 
the EU citizen to leave the Union. Not only the territory of a certain 
Member State, but the Union as a whole.
145
 This interpretation when 
applying Article 20 TFEU in the developing line of Cases following Ruiz 
Zambrano has been criticised for restricting the application of EU 
citizenship. In defence, CJEU held that EU law does not apply in wholly 
internal situations with the exception of the risk of losing the status of being 
a union citizen. In the circumstances EU law does not apply and a 
fundamental right risk being in breach CJEU has left the responsibility of 
the national courts to seek support in the national constitution and ECHR as 
was suggested in Dereci to solve the legal issue in accordance with these 
instruments.
146
  
 
In Zambrano Article 21, 24 or 34 in the CFR were invoked to be interpreted 
in conjunction with Article 20 TFEU. However according to Leanarts CJEU 
would have created a problem if it had given an affirmed that they should be 
read together with Article 20 TFEU since the CJEU then had acted outside 
of its own competence extending the scope of Article 20 TFEU. To bind the 
fundamental rights to the status of EU citizenship would have turned EU 
into a federation like system and to its very least create an association 
comparable to the legal system in the United States and the Bill of Rights 
which is an intrinsic part of being an American citizen.
147
 For the child’s 
right this illustrates were the limits goes in regard to an acquired right in EU 
law. The right to not have to leave the territory of the own Member State 
exists because the child is an EU citizen. The primary carer receive a 
derived right to reside with the child whom otherwise would not be capable 
to enjoy the substance of the right.  
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3.4 The Member States obligation in Article 20 
TFEU 
The principles set out in the previous judgements of Chu and Zhen
148
, 
Iida
149
 and Ruiz Zambrano
150
 were confirmed in Alopka. Ms Alopka was a 
Togo national living in Luxemburg who had a relationship with a French 
national Mr Moudoulou. She applied ‘for discretionary leave’ in 
Luxembourg which the authorities refused to grant. She had given birth to 
twins, and the children acquired French nationality. Ms Alopka applied 
eventually under EU legislation for a right to reside in Luxemburg, claiming 
that since she did not have a relationship with the children’s father she could 
not stay in France and that the children needed healthcare in Luxemburg due 
to their premature birth.
151
 The question referred to CJEU concerned 
whether Article 20 TFEU read in conjunction with Article 20, 21, 24, 33 
and 34 of the CFR could be construed as conferring a derived right of a 
third-country national who lives with her children that are EU-citizens in a 
host Member State were they have lived ever since birth. CJEU 
reformulated the question to also include Article 21 TFEU, and stated that a 
third-country national family member do not enjoy autonomous rights in EU 
law but may have derived rights to residence and entrance in certain 
circumstance in a Member State.
152
  
 
CJEU held that Ms Alopka could not be considered a beneficiary of the 
Directive 2004/38 Article 3(1) since she was in a similar situation as the 
parents in Zhu and Chen and Iida and could not be considered dependent in 
relation to her children.
153
 CJEU empathized that the EU citizen exercising 
the right to free movement, must have sufficient resources and a 
comprehensive sickness insurance to be able to rely on the free movement 
provision Article 21 TFEU.
154
 When the EU citizen is a child, the child has 
a right to be accompanied by a primary carer to not be deprived of the rights 
useful effect as has been held in Zhu and Chen and Iida. The decision 
whether the child had sufficient resources in accordance with Article 7(1) of 
Directive 2004/38 to reside in the host Member State was left to the national 
authorities to settle. Moreover, if the conditions set out in Article 7(1) of 
Directive 2004/38 were not achieved, Article 21 TFEU does not hinder a 
Member State from having national laws refusing Ms Alopka residence.
155
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CJEU then examined whether Article 20 TFEU prevents the Member State 
from having national laws which refused Ms Alopka residence caused by 
the derived right she had in relation to her children. It was stressed that since 
it was not excluded that Ms Alopka may ‘benefit of a derived right to reside 
in France’, to refuse Ms Alopka the right of residence in Luxemburg would 
not result in the circumstance that her children would have to leave the 
territory of the EU. Therefore did neither Article 20 TFEU exclude national 
laws that required that both the children and the primary carer had sufficient 
resources in order be allowed to reside in the host Member State.
156
 For the 
child’s right this means that if a primary carer accompanying the child in a 
host Member State and does not have sufficient resources and a 
comprehensive sickness insurance, the last resort for the child is to move to 
the Member State were the child is a national. That Member State is 
responsible for the child to remain in EU.  
                                                 
156
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4 PROTECTIONISM  
It was in the 1990’s that the child’s interest was started to be acknowledged 
in EU law, as a concept which was extended to exist also outside the sphere 
of the family. A wide spectrum of different measures with the purpose to 
protect children at a EU level has since the start been developed. Directives, 
Regulations and different policy and action programs as well as the CFR 
have been part of an increasing work in the endeavour to protect children in 
EU. Prior the accession of the Lisbon Treaty the Union traditionally has 
taken guidance from Human Rights, and concerning the right of the child 
both ECHR and UNCRC has influenced the work within EU.
 157
  
 
Before entering into the Lisbon Treaty the competence of EU concerning 
the possibilities to cooperate in criminal matters was limited, since it 
required intergovernmental decision making to take action. The earlier 
legislative decisions in regard to the protection of the child was taken under 
the first pillar, the later decision referable to the third-pillar was possible to 
taken after the accession of the Lisbon Treaty which broadened the 
competence of EU with in the ambit of safety and security.
158
 Within this 
growing paradigm which has moved the child’s right from the economical 
and international ambit into the that of safety, security and social justice 
children’s rights has become more than part of an greater economic goal. 
The vulnerability of the child and younger individuals has become 
acknowledged and progressive steps towards ensuring that the well-being of 
the child is protected have been taken within EU.
 159
  
 
To the protective measures must also Brussels II-Regulation be included; it 
is attributable to international child law. Already existing international 
instruments inspired the construction of the provisions forming an own EU 
instrument for protection of children in issues arising regarding parental 
responsibility in cross-border situations. Besides national rules in the 
Member States governing the choice of jurisdiction in parental 
responsibility disputes the European Custody Convention
160
, the Hauge 
Child Abduction Convention
161
, the Hauge Protection of Minors 
Convention
162
 and the Hague Child protection Convention
163
 was important 
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for the writing of the Brussels II-Regulation.
164
 In year 2000 the first version 
of Brussels II-Regulation
165
 came which dealt with parental responsibility 
when marriages ended in cross-border situations. The aim was to create a 
system which would effectively govern which court that would have 
jurisdiction in child custody matters. Also if the child was illegally moved 
or in using the term used in the Brussels II-Regulation abducted, by one of 
the parents ensure that the child immediately would be returned to the 
Member State of origin. This Regulation has been subject to a lot of 
criticism though; in the first version for example focused around the nuclear 
family it did not provide any protection for children of co-habitants or to 
step-children.  
 
Evidently, the hierarchy of relationships within the EU with the marriage 
placed at the top was still the prevailing norm and created problems when 
the family constellation in reality existed in more forms then that. The 
inflexible view of the family resulted in the unequal treatment of children, 
even if the aim with the Brussle II-Regulation was to protect them under EU 
law and not let any child slip through the cracks. The Commission proposed 
therefore in 2003 a new Regulation which replaced the first Brussle II-
Regulation dealing with the issue, now encompassing all children regardless 
if their parents were married or not.
166
 The new Regulation is however not 
unproblematic either. It deals with matters deduced to family law in the 
Member States and these laws influence the application of Brussels II-
Regulation.  
4.1 Abducted children’s best interest  
The question arises if an enforceable judgment in Accordance with Article 
21 and 42 could be declared not enforceable by a court in another Member 
State. Pursuant Article 21 the ‘judgement given in a Member State’ shall be 
recognised in the other Member State without any special procedure being 
required’. Pursuant Article 42 the return of a child may be ordered by the 
court issuing the judgment by the issuing of a certificate fulfilling three 
criteria. That the child has been given the right to be heard, and the parties 
has been given the same opportunity and the court has taken into account 
Article 13 in 1980 Hauge Convention stating that the authority that shall 
enforce the judgment may refuse to order to return a child if there exist a 
risk that the child will suffer psychological of physical harm.       
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Mrs Rinau a Lithuanian national married in 2003 Mr Rinau a German 
national, and they lived in Germany. In 2005 their daughter Luisa was born. 
A few months after the daughter’s birth Mrs and Mr Rinau separated, and 
Luisa stayed with her mother.
167
 In July 2006 Mrs Rinau went with her 
daughter to Lithuanian on vacation for two weeks with Mr Rinaus consent. 
Mrs Rinau decided to remain in Lithuanian and not return to Germany. Mr 
Rinau applied successfully for the right to custody of Luisa in the German 
court.
 
The dispute resulted in several proceedings back and forth in the 
national courts.
 168
 In June 2007 however, the German court established the 
divorce between Mr and Mrs Rinau and granted the custody rights to Mr 
Rinau.
169
 Mrs Rinau turned to Lithunianan court and applied for non-
recognition of the German judgment. To the part that ordered the return of 
the child and the granting of the custody rights to the father Mrs Rinau 
invoked that the decision should be set aside and that a new application for a 
decision should be granted for non-recognition of the German judgment.
170
 
The national court turned to CJEU and requested if it is possible to apply for 
non-recognition of a judgment that have been settled pursuant Article 21 
regarding parental responsibility, and certified in accordance with Article 
42, in the circumstances no application for the judgments enforcement has 
been made.  
 
Also the question was asked if a national court may re-open a judgement 
ordering the return of a child to review it when the national court in the 
Member State of origin has failed to comply with the procedure laid down 
in the Brussels II-Regulation, including protecting the best interest of the 
child?
171
 CJEU held that according to Article 11(8) of the Brussels II-
Regulation a non-return judgment pursuant Article 13 of the 1980 Hague 
Convention has no effect when the judgement is enforceable in accordance 
with Section 4 of Chapter III order to secure the return of the child in the 
Brussels II-Regulation.
172
 The rules are governed by the underlying 
objective of the 1980 Hauge Convention, which is to ensure that the 
conditions for promoting the immediate return of the child are upheld. The 
CJEU held that if a non-recognition judgement would enjoy procedural 
autonomy it would result in the delay of the return of the child to the 
Member State of origin. CJEU further stated that certified judgements, 
priority has been given to the jurisdiction of the Member State of origin, and 
non-recognition judgments are preceded by judgements taken pursuant 
Article 11(8), 40 and 42.
173
 This means that a judgement issued pursuant 
Article 21 may be stopped from being enforced by a non-recognition 
judgement. However, that non-recognition judgement does not prevent the 
national court in the Member State of origin in the case that child has not 
been returned to issue a certificate in accordance with Article 11(8), 40 and 
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42.
174
 The reason for handling certified judgments in this manner is inter 
alia explained by Article 11(3), which provides that the national courts must 
act expeditious when handling the return of wrongfully removed children.
175
 
The priority is to return the child to the Member State were the child has his 
or her habitual residence prior to the wrongful removal. To allow the 
national court in the Member State were the child is wrongfully retained to 
review judgments prior the enforcement would slow down the process. This 
would constitute a risk to the well-being of the child and the Brussels II-
Regulation would risk lose its useful effect, which is to protect the child.
176
 
This judgement meant for the right of the child that the criteria set out in 
Article 13 in 1980 Hauge Convention should not apply to the child if a 
judgment had been issued pursuant Article 21 and Article 42 in Regulation 
1612/68.   
 
Ms Purrucker gave prematurely birth to twins, a boy and a girl called Merlin 
and Samira in Spain. The children had to be hospitalised. Merlin left the 
hospital a couple of months and Samira had to stay a bit longer.
177
 Ms 
Purruckers relationship with Mr Vallés Pérez ended and she wanted to move 
to Germany. Mr Vallés Pérez agreed to only have access and gave Ms 
Purrucker custody rights to Merlin and Samira.
178
 Mr Vallés Pérez then 
changed his mind and brought a proceeding before the national court in 
Spain seeking a provisional measure to be awarded custody rights of the 
children. Ms Purrucker brought a proceeding before the national court in 
Germany also seeking custody rights. Mr Vallés Pérez successfully brought 
a proceeding in Germany for the enforcement of the Spanish judgement, 
which granted provisional measures rights to custody.
179
 Ms Purrucker 
contested the provisional measure awarded on the basis of Article 20 in 
Brussels II-Regulation. The question arise and in essence concerned if a 
provisional measure which may be granted under urgent circumstances also 
is possible to enforce as a judgement issued under Article 21 in Brussels II-
Regulation.
180
  CJEU stating that Article 20 is not subject to the dealing of 
jurisdiction in regard to parental responsibility. What it provides is the 
possibility for the national court in urgent cases to take provisional measures 
existing in national law even if the national court of substantive jurisdiction 
is another court.
181
 CJEU stated that the Brussels II-Regulation because it is 
EU law prevail national law. It prevails also therefore International 
Conventions entailed in Article 59 to 63 in the Brussels II-Regulation. 
CJEU held that Brussels II-Regulation builds upon the principle of mutual 
trust between Member States, which according to the CJEU ‘is a 
cornerstone for the creation of a genuine judicial area’.182 To allow 
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enforcement and recognition of judgements within the scope of Article 20 in 
all Member States including Member States having substantive jurisdiction 
would give raise to the risk of the parties trying to circumvent the provisions 
in Brussels II-Regulation. Creating the possibility of forum shopping, this 
would be contrary to the intention of the EU legislator. CJEU further held 
that the objective of the Brussels II-Regulation is to safeguard the best 
interest of the child when a decision is taken that concerns the child and the 
legislator has decided that the best suited court is the one that is closely 
situated to were the child was habitual residence.
183
  
4.2 Abducted children’s best interest under 
changed circumstances  
The two most questionable judgments are Detiček184 and Povse185 in regard 
to how the best interest of the child is used to justify a clear cut application 
of the main rule in the Brussels II-Regulation, which is a fast as possible 
return of the child if the child has been abducted.  
 
In Detiček the national court in Italy ruled that the father was entitled the 
custody rights to the daughter Antonella, who should be placed at a 
children’s home during an undecided period of time. Ms Detiček then took 
the daughter with her to Slovenia were she had her family and Antonella 
adjusted into the new social environment.
186
The Italian judgement was 
declared enforceable in Slovenia and the Slovenian court ordered the return 
of Antonella to Italy. Ms Detiček appealed the judgement and invoked 
Article 13 of 1980 Hauge Convention arguing that Antonella had become 
adjusted into the society in Slovenia and it would be against her best interest 
if she was returned to Italy. To send her back would mean that she would 
suffer psychological and emotional trauma. 
187
 Antonella had also expressly 
stated that she wanted stay with her mother in Slovenia.
188
Question, arise if 
a provisional measure according Article 20 could be taken to overrule an 
enforceable judgement such as the one at issue to protect the fundamental 
rights of the child? CJEU stressed that the underlying objective of the 
Brussels II- Regulation was to protect the best interest of the child in 
accordance with recital 12 of the Brussels II-Regulation. According to 
Article 8 in the Brussels II-Regulation the main rule is that the national 
courts were the child is habitually resident has jurisdiction.
189
 An exemption 
to that rule is found in Article 20, which under certain exceptional 
circumstances may give a court jurisdiction to grant provisional, protective 
measures even if the national court has no substantive jurisdiction. These 
conditions consists of three accumulative requirements set out in Article 20, 
namely the case is urgent, the person or its asset is present in the Member 
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State in question and the measure is be provisional.
190
 Nonetheless, CJEU 
stressed that Article 20 of the Brussels II-Regulation cannot be interpreted 
in such a manner that it disregard the right of the child in Article 24 in CFR 
especially Article 24(3) stating that the child has a right on a regular basis to 
remain contact with both his or her parents.
191
 Moreover, it is presumable 
that wrongful removals of children deprive them of the possibility to remain 
in contact with both their parents, and only if it is not contrary to the best 
interest of the child.
192
 CJEU then reached the conclusion that all interests 
involved must be objectively examined, also those concerning the child and 
the social environment relating to him or her before the national court that 
have substantive jurisdiction.
193
 CJEU also held that the CFR supported this 
interpretation. That to follow through with the objective of the Brussels II-
Regulation to return the child in accordance with an enforceable judgement 
meant that Article 24(3) actually had been considered. The reasoning behind 
was depended on a general assumption that the return of the child would 
most likely result in that the child would remain in contact with both the 
parents. This meant that even if the child has become adjusted into the 
society a general presumption that the child shall be returned is in its best 
interest, because then can the child remain in contact with both his or her 
parents according Article 24 (3) CRF.    
 
Another example of this kind of doubtful reasoning in regard to Brussels II-
Regulation is found in Povse. Sofia the daughter to Mr Alpago an Italian 
national and Ms Povse an Austrian national, was taken from Italy to Austria. 
Eventually the national court gave Ms Povse provisional custody. In that 
judgement, Mr Alpago was considered to not be capable of being 
responsible for Sofia and that he would cause her harm if he was awarded 
the custody right. Instead Mr Alapago was granted access to the daughter 
under supervision of a social worker, but Ms Povse did provide him 
minimal access. This led to the result that the father could not engage fully 
as a parent according to the social worker, which affected the interest of the 
child.
194
 The Italian court therefore decided to issue another judgment 
demanding Sofia back to Italy so that the relationship between father and 
child could be re-established. The national court in Austria refused to order 
the return of Sofia due to the grave risk Mr Alpago constituted to Sofias 
psychological well-being. The question that arises was to what effect 
provisional protective measure could have in the case a mother was granted 
custody rights and moved back to her Member State of origin with the child. 
Could this change the child’s habitual residence if the child became adjusted 
into the new social environment? CJEU held that the national court having 
jurisdiction had been given a central position in the Brussels II-Regulation 
and judgements concerning provisional measure taken by these courts was 
to be considered as judgements, even if they may be changed due to 
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changed circumstances regarding the custody of the child.
195
 If the court that 
had jurisdiction because of the child’s habitual residence before the 
unlawful removal would be prevented from taking provisional measures, 
due to the change in the child’s habitual residence that occurred during the 
child staying in the other Member State. I would make it problematic for the 
national court of substance to take provisional measures granting one parent 
custody rights until the final judgment would be taken.
196
 The national court 
also sought an answer to the question if a provisional measure may be taken 
against a certified and enforceable judgement that is irreconcilable with a 
prior judgement.
197
 CJEU stressed that  a clear division has been establish 
between courts in the Member States in and in the Brussels II-Regulation, 
and the task of the court were the enforcement is sought is to provide that 
the child will be returned securely and rapid.
198
 If any question arises 
concerning the application of law the issue must be raised in the court that 
has made the error in accordance with the national law of that court.
199
 A 
certified judgment cannot be prevented enforcement even if it is 
irreconcilable with a  previous judgement awarding provisional parental 
responsibility to the parent in the Member State were the child is present.
200
 
Lastly, the national court requested an answer to the question if a certified 
judgement could be prevented enforceability due to changed circumstances 
in regard to the best interest of the child. CJEU held that if a significant 
change in circumstances had appeared the issue had to be solved in the court 
with jurisdiction, since this court also has jurisdiction to consider the best 
interest of the child. Because of this, the court of enforcement must strictly 
abide the procedural rules and is not allowed to review any substantive 
matter in the judgement since that would be to act outside own its 
jurisdiction.
201
CJEU held that a certified judgement could not be prevented 
from being enforced, not even under the circumstance the same court had 
issued a previous judgement irreconcilable with the new judgement. 
Changes concerning the best interest of the child could not prevent the 
enforceability of a certified judgement. The legal situation had to be solved 
in the national court that had jurisdiction in the matter, in that court could 
also the best interest of the child be considered. It seems more important to 
protect a rigid application of Regulation 1612/68 in order for it to not be 
misused. Though it appears as the rights of the child is not recognised the 
CJEU place the responsibility on the court that has the substantive 
jurisdiction to be considered the suitable court to protect the best interest of 
the child.    
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4.3 Lawfully moved children’s best interest 
In contrast to Rinau
202
, Purrucker
203, Detiček204 and Povse205 the judgments 
Mercredi
206
 provides a different understanding of how the best interest of 
the child is used. The court interpret the concept habitual residence namely 
in the light of the best interest of the child. To decide which court that 
would be best suited to deal with a legal proceeding regarding custody 
issues concerning the child. By comparison in the judgments above the 
court had held that the best suited court was the one were the child was 
habitual resident and if the child had be unlawfully abducted the court were 
the child was habitual resident prior to the unlawful abduction. In Mercredi 
the child was lawfully moved and therefore interpreted CJEU the concept. 
Ms Mercredi had lawfully moved from UK to France with the daughter 
Cholé. She and the daughter was resident in France during four day
207
, when 
the father applied for custody rights in regard to Chloé. The English court 
was of the opinion that it was the first seized court and that the proceeding 
therefore should be held there. The mother applied for sole custody rights in 
France and that court was of the opinion that it was the court were Chloé 
was habitually resident, and therefor had jurisdiction.
208
 CJEU Since only 
the mother had custody rights of Chloé she had been lawfully moved.
209
 
However, the concept ‘habitual residence’ had to be given an autonomous 
meaning for the purpose of a uniform application in the Member States.
210
 
The CJEU pointed out that when determining the concept ‘habitual 
residence’ it must be read in the light of the other provisions of the Brussels 
II-Regulation. In that regard the best interest of the child had to be 
considered when interpreting Article 8(1) in the Brussels II-Regulation.  
CJEU held that habitually resident correspond to how much the child has 
become integrated in the social and family environment. The national court 
has to do a test and consider all factors of importance in each individual case 
to evaluate if the child has become habitual resident in the new Member 
State.
211
 Factors such as the reasons for the stay, the child’s nationality, 
child’s age if it is an infant or an child in school age, if it is an infant how 
well is the mother integrated in the new social environment etc.
212
 
Furthermore CJEU held that the concept ‘habitual residence’ is a place that 
reflects integration, duration, regularity, reasons for stay.
213
 For the child’s 
right this meant that if the child is lawfully moved larger consideration will 
be taken in regard to different aspects of the child’s life to determine which 
court is most suited to handle any cross-border custody issue in regard to the 
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child. This stands sharp contrast to the systematic applied in Rinau, 
Purrucker, Detiček and Poves in which the children were abducted.     
4.4 Voulnerable children’s best interest 
In two judgments C
214
 and S
215
, CJEU included public matters referable to 
parental responsibility into the concept civil matter, and thereby making the 
Brussels-II Regulation applicable in matters when public authority placed 
children in foster homes or even send them away to be treated of self-
destructive behaviour at a secure institution in another Member State.  The 
Brussels II-Convention covers civil matters only even it does refer to 
placement of children at foster home or institutional care pursuant Article 
1(2)(d).   
 
In C CJEU managed to subsume also child-care issues treated as public 
matters in national law, to fall within the scope of the Brussels II-
Regulation. The interpretation was justified by the purpose to treat all 
children equal and provide for them the same protection. The case took 
place in Sweden were the Social Welfare Board had ordered that the 
children, child A an Swedish and Finish national and child B a Finish 
national immediately should be placed in a foster home.
216
 Directly after the 
decision had been taken A and B’s mother C took the children and moved to 
Finland were they became resident.
217
 CJEU acknowledge that to take a 
child into care is not expressly stated in Article 1(2). Stating that does 
encompass parental responsibility, which falls within the scope of Brussels 
II-Regulation. The provision indicated that it only should be used as a 
guide.
218
 According to the preamble of the Brussels II-Regulation the 
purpose is to ensure equal treatment of all children which means that all 
decisions taken in relation to parental responsibility is covered by the 
Brussels II-Regulation, ‘including measures for the purpose of protecting 
children’.219 To exclude decisions relating to parental responsibility taken 
by the authority for the purpose of protecting the child by place it in a foster 
home or in an institution would risk to have the effect that the effectiveness 
of the Brussels II-Regulation disappeared.
220
 To not include public decision 
related to parental responsibility in the concept ‘civil matter’ would 
compromise the objective of the Brussels II-Regulation as well as the 
principle of equal treatment, which is to protect children.
221
 This meant that 
children when the national authority decides to take protective measures and 
is taken to another Member State a judgement can be issued ordering the 
children back to the Member State at issue.  The meaning of this in regard to 
the child’s right in EU law is that if the national authority has decided to 
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take the child into care for the purpose of placing that child in a foster home 
and the parent tries to escape the measure by moving to another Member 
Sate then it is possible to bring the child back for the purpose of providing 
an suitable solution for the child so that the child may continue to go to 
school etc. and not become marginalised in the society.    
 
If the placement of a child in foster home or in an institution was covered by 
the Brussels II-Regulation did also a placement at a secure institution 
account as a decision by administrative authority referable to parental 
responsibility. In the Case S was considered to not be possible to help in 
Ireland. Due to S self-harming, aggressive and violent behaviour the 
authority on Ireland wanted to place her at a secure institution in England 
which they hoped could help her.
222
 CJEU held that the concept parental 
responsibility in relation to public authority in Article 2(9), had to be 
interpreted as encompass the transferred responsibility to take care of the 
child from the parent to the administrative authority. The broad 
interpretation served the purpose of protecting the child.
223
 Furthermore, 
CJEU held that children who were placed at institutions were in a particular 
vulnerable situation and it would go against the objective of the Directive to 
exclude placement at secure institutions.
224
 Account had to be taken in 
regard to the prerequisite of prior contentment from the central authority 
with jurisdiction to grant a place of the child at a secure institution in the 
Member State before a court before the judge may order a child to be taken 
into care in another Member State.
225
  
 
For the child’s right this means that the national authorities can decide to 
place the child into a secure institution in other Member States. It is 
doubtful that this serves the best interest of the child to be forced not only 
into a secure institution but also to move to another Member State.  It is 
likely that the child due to its self-destructive behaviour did not have much 
saying in the matter. From one perspective one may argue that if the 
institution is good and the child actually may benefit from treatment at it 
then it is positive that the possibility to do this exists. From another 
perspective one may argue that an already vulnerable individual is being put 
into an even greater risk to fare badly.    
4.5 Unaccompanied children’s best interest  
Another protective measure in regard to the protection of children in EU law 
is found in Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 the so called 
Dublin I-Regulation establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum 
application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national. 
It has been held quite clear that the first transit Member State the refugee 
enters when entering EU is the one were asylum may be sought. However, 
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in the MA CJEU took another standpoint in regard to unaccompanied 
minors, stressing the importance to protect children. The child MA an 
Eritrean national arrived to UK and lodged an application for asylum 
there.
226
 The only problem was that she had already lodged an application 
for asylum in Italy as well. Due to this, the national authorities in the UK 
ordered her to be send back to Italy in accordance with the Dublin I-
Regulation. The order was never executed since MA brought a proceeding 
before national court, the High Court of Justice of England and Wales, 
Queens Bench Division and challenged the order of being transferred to 
Italy.
227
 MA received on 25 March 2010 refugee status in accordance with 
Article 3(2) of the Dublin I-Regulation by the Secretary of State.
228
 The 
High Court of Justice declared that in accordance with Article 6 of the 
Dublin I-Regulation an ‘unaccompanied minor claiming asylum and having 
no family member legally present in the territory of one of the Member 
States is liable to be removed to the Member State were he first made an 
asylum application’.229 Since the application was dismissed MA appealed 
the matter before the Court of Appeal (England and Wales) (Civil Division), 
in a joined case with two other the appellants also unaccompanied minors in 
similar circumstance. The appeal concerned how Article 5(2) and Article 6 
in the Dublin I-Regulation should be interpreted in regard to unaccompanied 
minors. Due to the differences in the wording between Article 5(2) ‘first 
lodged his application’ and Article (6) ‘has lodged his or her application’ it 
was unclear whether the children’s application in the UK precede the 
application made in Italy.  
 
CJEU had to clarify how the provisions should be construed when the minor 
asylum seeker had lodged an application for asylum in more than one 
Member State.
230
 CJEU commence by stating that according to Article 6 in 
the Dublin I-Regulation the responsible Member State for the asylum 
seeking minor is the Member State in, which the family members to the 
minor lives. In the case the child is unaccompanied and per definition does 
not have any family members in any Member State, then the responsibly 
Member State is the one there the application has been lodged according to 
Article 6 second subparagraph.
231
 Further since it was not clear what ‘has 
been lodged’ meant the court held that in EU law not only a textual 
interpretation has to be made but also the context must be considered to 
which the provision refers as well as the objective of the Dublin I-
Regulation. CJEU held that the sentence ‘where the minor has lodged his 
application’ in Article 6 could not have the same meaning as ‘first lodged 
his application’ in Article 5(2) and Article 13 of the Dublin I-Regulation.232 
The reasoning behind was that it is important that Member States does not 
prolong the procedures involving unaccompanied minors. They belong to a 
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category of individuals who are particularly vulnerable. The last lodged 
application shall therefore be considered valid and the Member State shall 
no send them back. This conclusion was also considered supported by the 
preamble of the Dublin I-Regulation in which reference to the CFR is made, 
including Article 24(2) the best interest of the child, which the Court 
pointed out must be considered when interpreting Article 6 in the Dublin I-
Regulation.
233
 This means for the right of the child that the most vulnerable 
individuals unaccompanied asylum seekers shall be protected from being 
thrown back into the system again if they have not followed it in the way the 
EU legislator has stipulated. The unaccompanied child will enjoy the 
protection of the Member State were the child has lodged the application 
and is present in.    
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5 CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS 
Lastly the forth paradigm that I will refer to as a quasi-paradigm turned up 
with the introduction of the CFR. The fundamental rights of the child in 
Article 24 in the CFR, is a concept that both in international law and in EU 
law has a quite short history.
234
  
 
In 1990, UNCRC entered into force. The overall concept is that the child 
partly is a part of a family and partly also a human being with its own 
identity. Who with age and maturity become more and more capable of 
taking his or her own altering decision. The governing idea is thus that 
children are human beings and as such they are endowed with human rights, 
which extend over of the field of civil, political, economic and cultural. 
These rights are connected to their human dignity that each child has.
235
 
 
Nevertheless before the UNCRC was adopted, and likewise the CFR, 
ECtHR recognised children when applying Article 8 ECHR ‘the right to 
family life’. It was in particular the best interest of the child was developed 
as a concept applicable to children. Because CJEU commenced to apply 
Article 8 ECHR and recognised the human right as a fundamental right, it 
became part of EU law.
236
  CJEU has stated that Article 7 CFR provides a 
corresponding right in regard to Article 8 ECHR, which means that ECtHR 
interpretation is valid in EU law.
237
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5.1 CRF its scope and application 
The CFR is a codification of already existing principles and rights. Further 
did the fundamental rights enshrined in CFR exist initially as ‘general 
principles’ in EU law.238 As a legal instrument the fundamental rights 
appeared in the judgement of CJEU in 1969.
239
  
It was first held in Stauder
240
 that fundamental rights are a part of general 
principles of EU law. The inclusion meant that CJEU received a foundation 
for justifying EU measures that were imposed on Member States. The EU 
legal order building upon the principles of EU primacy and direct effect, had 
to find a way to become adjustable with fundamental rights in the Member 
States, since it became evident that it was impossible to disregard from 
fundamental rights when applying EU law.
241
 Evolving from this premise 
two lines of case law was created and became a doctrine, which continues to 
develop, of how the fundamental rights shall be applied in EU law.
242
 The 
first line follows upon Wachauf
243
, which states that fundamental rights 
apply when EU law is implemented or applied and the second line follows 
upon ERT, which states that fundamental rights apply when EU law is 
derogated from by national measures such as a public policy.
244
  
 
Unfortunately did not the CFR make it much clearer in regard to when the 
CFR becomes applicable in EU law. It is stated in Article 51 CFR that it 
applies to ‘Member states only when they are implementing EU law’. This 
came across as somewhat cryptic since the case law of CJEU suggests 
otherwise. To not exemplify in Article 51 CRF any more precise criteria 
keeps it open for interpretation. Nevertheless when Member States are 
obliged to apply EU law they also must adjust to how CJEU has decided 
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that EU law shall be understood.
245
 It may be that it was considered that 
Fundamental Rights ought to be considered part of EU law already since it 
enjoys the status of primary law and is recognised as such pursuant Article 6 
TEU. Article 6 TEU provides that ‘the Union recognises the rights, 
freedoms and principles set out in the CFR of the EU […] which shall have 
same legal status as the Treaties.’ When EU law is applied the CFR shall 
already have approved the EU rule, and therefore lies the duty not so much 
in the hands of the Member State to ensure that this is the case, but rather in 
the hands of CJEU.  
 
In Åkerberg
246
 CJEU made reference to the DEB
247
 Case in which it was 
established that Article 51 CFR must be read in conjunction with Article 6 
TEU and Article 52(7) that provides that CJEU shall give guidance to the 
national court when EU law applies to national law.
248
  
This mean that CJEU has the possibility to interfere in the national 
legislation to ensure that it is in compliance with EU law in the 
circumstance EU law apply and there is a breach of a fundamental right. The 
limit though, regarding the possibility to apply the Fundamental Rights was 
set in regard to the competence of EU to apply EU law.
249
 This in 
accordance with Article 51(2) in the CFR that states that ‘The Charter does 
not extend the field of application of EU Law beyond the powers of EU or 
establish any new power or task for EU, or modify powers and tasks as 
defined in the Treaties’. 
 
Furthermore, when EU law is to some degree but not entirely applicable 
within an ambit of national law, which to a large extent is governed by 
national law, the national court may apply the national constitution to ensure 
that the fundamental rights are protected as long as ‘the primacy, unity and 
effectiveness of European EU law are not thereby compromised’.250 This 
legal context will have an effect on the application of the right of the child 
in Article 24 CFR and effect how the application by CJEU and national 
courts will look like.  
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5.2 Article 24 CRF the rights of the child 
Article 24 The Rights of the Child 
1. Children shall have the right to such protection and care as is necessary for their 
well-being. They may express their views freely. Such views shall be taken into 
consideration on matters which concerns them in accordance with their age and 
maturity. 
2. In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private 
institutions, the child’s best interest must be a primary consideration. 
3. Every child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a personal 
relationship and direct contact with both his or her parents, unless that is contrary 
to his or her interest.  
5.2.1 Article 24(1) the childs right to be heard 
Pursuant Article 24(1) the child has a right to express his or her views 
freely. In particular this speaks of the child as being an ‘agent’ that will say 
an autonomous individual with a mind of his or her own, able to make 
decisions concerning the own circumstances. This self-reliance is dependent 
upon the influence, advice and support from others though. In accordance 
with the child’s age and maturity. The provision does therefor entail a 
limitation, which makes it possible to consider these aspects of a child’s 
evolving ability to manage him or herself. Article 24(1) is supported by 
Article 6 in the ECHR, according that article when the authorities is in 
contact with children the child has the right to receive all relevant 
information for the purpose of being able to express his or her views.
251
  
The right for the child to be heard is included in Brussels II-Regulation in 
recital 19 in the preamble, it is stated that ‘the hearing of a child is an 
important part of the application of the Brussels II-Regulation, although this 
instrument is not intended to modify national procedures’. Pursuant Article 
11(2) the child shall have the right to be heard when it has been wrongfully 
removed and Article 12 and 13 in Hauge Convention on child abduction 
applies. These provisions deal with the order of the return of a child that has 
been wrongfully removed. According Article 12 the authorities shall order 
the return of the child within one year unless the child has been settled into 
the new environment. According to Article 13 the authority may refuse the 
return of the child if there is a grave risk that the child would suffer harm if 
it was returned to the Member State of origin.  
In Zarraga the German court refused to recognise the Spanish judgement 
ordering Andrea back to Spain to her father, were she expressly had stated 
that she did not want to live.
252
 Andrea had not been heard in the Spanish 
proceedings and the German court considered that it ought to be able to set 
aside the enforceable judgement due to the fact that there had been a breach 
of Andreas fundamental right in Article 24(1) CFR.
253
 The Brussels II-
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Regulation of the return of the child in Article 42, requires that when a 
certificate is being issued in regard to a judgment concerning custody rights 
the child’s right to be heard must be observed according to Article 42(2)(a). 
As one ground for the certificate to be valid, ‘the child was given an 
opportunity to be heard, unless a hearing was considered inappropriate 
having regarded to his or her age or degree of maturity’. This was the 
provision that the German court considered to be in breach with Andreas 
right to be heard in CRF and CJEU interpreted. Could the breach of the 
child’s fundamental right to be heard allow for the set aside of a certificated 
enforceable judgment issued under Article 42(2)(a).  
In regard to the child’s fundamental right to be heard, CJEU held that the 
Brussels II-Regulation had to be interpreted in accordance with the CFR.
254
 
However, the only court allowed to review an issued certificate was the 
court that had issued it in the first place. That court should correct its own 
mistake if it had made one. CJEU explained further that Article 24(1) the 
right for the child to be heard consisted in the opportunity to be heard. That 
the best interest of the child pursuant Article 24(2) provided that when 
determining if the child shall be heard the age and maturity of the child must 
be considered.
255
 If it is in the best interest of the child to not be heard then 
it shall not be that. Therefore is the right of the child to be heard not an 
absolute right.
 256
 The CFR was applied in conjunction with the Brussels II-
Regulation and interpreting the right to be heard therein. The CFR was used 
to shed light on what the right to be heard meant in the Brussels II-
Regulation.    
5.2.2 Article 24(2) the best interest of the child 
In the second part of the rights of the child provision, Article 24 (2) the 
purpose is to impose an obligation on public authority and private 
institutions to view the issues concerning the child from a child’s 
perspective. The provision may be seen as a supportive provision, which 
back up other provisions that must be interpreted in the light of the best 
interest of the child.
257
  
 
In the Brussels II-Regulation the best interest of the child is of main concern 
to consider according recital 12 as well as the rights in CFR shall be 
recognised and the principles observed with due regard to Article 24 CFR. 
These objectives are referred to frequently by CJEU, which often uses the 
best interest of the child as a ground for justification why a provision shall 
be understood in a certain manner. What is problematic though is that the 
principle of mutual recognition is interpreted in the light of the best interest 
of the child, and CJEU or less contends that is in best interest of the child, 
because the return of the child will fulfil Article 24(3) the child’s right to be 
accompanied by both parents, which may be or may not be true depending 
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on all specific circumstances in the case.  (See also how CJEU has used the 
best interest of the child in Rinau, Purrucker I, Detiček, Povse and Mercredi 
in section 4.1 in this thesis)  
 
A good example though when the best interest of the child has been used to 
interpreted a provision in EU law is found in the MA case. In this case CJEU 
applied the best interest of the child when interpreting the Dublin I-
Regulation in a highly professional manner. It had been possible for CJEU 
to make another interpretation of the relevant provision. Instead of 
following the logic of the other provisions when in relation to the somewhat 
unclear provision CJEU interpreted it in the light of the best interest of the 
child. Something that meant that the child was to be helped by the Member 
State in were the child had lodged an application, without the child having 
to go through any more traumatising movements. The objective to protect 
the unaccompanied minors was reached as far as is possible on a supra legal 
level.        
5.2.3 Article 24(3) the childs right to both the parents  
In the third part of the rights of the child in Article 24 (3) it is stated that the 
child has a right on a regular basis to remain in contact with both his or her 
parents. According the provision the only exemption from this is when it 
would be against the best interest of the child. This Article has been used in 
different types of cases for instance in Iida, McB and O and S. Both in Iida 
and McB the CFR was invoked for the purpose to provide them certain 
rights under EU law, however not particular successfully. In Iida a derived 
rights as a primary carer to a child that had moved to another Member State 
was claimed. In McB custody rights, that normally has to be acquired under 
national law. In O and S though the national court were instructed how to 
construe Article 7(1)(c) in Directive 2003/86 in accordance with Article 
24(3) CFR. 
 
In Iida CJEU did not only revolve the interpretation of Article 20 TFEU and 
Article 21TFEU in regard to the question if a primary carer is not 
accompanying the child to another Member State and stays in the Member 
State were the child is a national. In conjunction with Article 7 the right to 
family life in the CFR CJEU interpreted Article 24(3) the child’s right to on 
a regular basis remain in contact with both his or her parents, and if that 
provision could give the primary carer a derived right from the child. This 
would mean that Mr Iida under EU law would acquire a right of residence in 
the Member State were his daughter was a national. The reasoning of CJEU 
was the following. For the CFR to apply, national law that regulates the 
right to residence must be governed by EU law. Since EU law govern 
residence permits the CFR applies.  However, EU law does not apply when 
the situation is wholly internal and due to the fact that Mr Iida has not 
moved to join Mia his daughter in the other Member State. Therefore did 
the CFR not apply.
258
 The reasoning behind CJEU conclusion is that the 
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CFR has to be applied within in its own limits pursuant Article 51(1) 
CRF.
259
 In regard to what this meant for the child’s right in circumstances at 
issue the child was not deterred from exercising her right to free movement 
and was already accompanied. The third-country national primary carer 
whom did not join her could not have a derived right to residence since 
there was no EU link and due to this the CFR did not apply.  
 
Mr McB invoked that ought to have custody rights derived from Article 7 
and Article 24 in CFR, since he was the father of the children he had 
together with E and because they have lived in a marriage like relationship. 
CJEU held that it would be ‘incompatible with requirements of legal 
certainty´ if Article 2(11) in Brussels II-Regulation could be interpreted in 
conjunction with the CFR Article 7 and Article 24 in a manner that gave a 
parent custody rights when national laws did not. Article 2(11) provides that 
a child has been unlawfully removed when a person who does not have 
custody rights of the child, move with the child to another Member State. 
CJEU held that to give effect to Article 7 and Article 24 in a manner that Mr 
McB argued, would extend the application of the CFR outside the scope of 
competence of CJEU pursuant Article 51(1) in the CFR. The CFR of the 
mother would also be infringed by such an interpretation.
260
 CJEU did 
elaborate on how Article 7 CFR and Article 24 CFR had to be understood. 
When applying Article 7 this provision had to be read in a manner so that it 
respected the best interest of the child, and the child’s right to on a regular 
basis remain in contact with both the parents. Brussels II-Regulation did 
provide that the best interest of the child is of main concern when 
interpreting Brussels II-Regulation.  National laws, that gives the mother an 
automatic custody right, and the farther has to seek to receive is not 
prevented by Article 24 CFR. Because the national proceedings in which the 
custody rights is settled may consider all relevant aspects of fact that may 
have an impact on the child and interpret the situation in regard to the best 
interest of the child .
261
 In regard to the right of custody CJEU gave the 
child’s right protection under national law, where the best interest of the 
child could be considered    
 
In O and S CJEU interpreted Article 7(1)(c) in the light of the rights of the 
child and the right to family life contained in the CFR.    
CJEU held that the objective with the Directive is to promote family 
reunification and protect especially minors. The person who must have 
sufficient means to be able to provide for the family in the Member State 
addressed to the ‘sponsor’, and not the third-country nation who seeks to 
reside with his spouse in the host Member State.
262
 CJEU held that Article 
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7(1)(c) in the family reunification Directive had to be read in line with 
fundamental rights and principles enshrined in the CRF.
263
In interpreting 
Article 7 the right to respect for family life CJEU held Article 8(1) of ECHR 
is a corresponding right which has been interpreted in a manner that also 
considered the right of the child. The provision therefore also has to be read 
in conjunction with Article 24 taking into consideration the best interest of 
the child and the need for a child to maintain contact with both parents his 
or her parents on a regular basis.
264
 Moreover, CJEU held that when 
Member States interpreting national law they have to comply with not only 
EU law but also make sure that the CFR rights are not conflicted when 
implementing secondary legislation.
265
 When the national authorities 
estimate if the ‘sponsor’ has sufficient resources in accordance with Article 
7(1) of Directive 2003/86 to provide for the joining family member, 
consideration must be taken in regard to Articles 7 and 24(2) and (3) of the 
CFR. The best interest of the child as well as and the respect for family life 
as is stated in Article 5(5) in the Directive 2003/86 and recital 2.
266
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6 CONCLUSION 
When determining what a right means such as what a child’s right mean in 
EU law, drawing from the interpretation of the CJEU. It is called for to 
weigh in at least three different aspects when defining the rights of the child. 
The first aspect is who is the right addressed to, in other words whom is 
considered to be a child for the right to apply? The second aspect to consider 
is what does the right comprise of, what will be the benefit of falling within 
its scope? The third aspect to consider is when it exist rights that appears 
within different fields of EU law, such as children’s rights under worker’s 
rights, EU citizenship rights and protective measure rights, how are these 
children’s rights looked at by the CJEU? What are the similarities or 
differences between how the CJEU handle the rights? By putting these 
different aspects together the question initially asked in the introduction of 
this thesis, ‘What does the right of the child in EU law mean?’ will finally 
receive its answer.    
 
Within the legal field of free movement of workers and their family 
members, the child move with the worker to resided with the worker and 
while doing so receives a derived right to residence under Regulation 
1612/68. The objective with the directive is to not also facilitate free 
movement of workers and their family members but also to promote 
integration into the society of both the worker and the workers family 
members. As part to this objective to promote integration the child is 
conferred a right to education under Article 12 in Regulation 1612/68 which 
states that ‘children of a national of a Member State who is or has been 
employed shall be admitted to that states general education […] under the 
same conditions as the nationals, of the State, if such children are residing in 
the territory’.  
 
The basic premise for coming into enjoyment of the right to education is to 
be a child of a worker. This means that when considering who has the right 
to education, the aspect of who is a worker also has a decisive influence for 
the purpose of applying Article 12 in Directive 1612/68. In Echternacht and 
Moritz the ECJ concluded that for the child to a worker to become entitled 
to rely on Article 12, the child must live with the worker. Also it is possible 
to have lived with the worker during the time the worker was economically 
active and then ceased to work was held in Landesamt. In Brown the court 
concluded that it is not sufficient though to just be a child of a worker if the 
child never has lived with the worker while working in a host Member 
State. Accordingly, to be considered a child to a worker and thereby fall 
within the scope of application of Regulation 1612/68 and thereby have a 
right to education pursuant Article 12, the child must live or have lived with 
the worker while the worker has been economically active.  
 
In consideration of the second aspect to discern what the child’s right to 
education consists of I consider that one must go back to where it all began, 
to the ruling in Casagrande. CJEU namely held that the principle of equal 
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treatment is part of Article 12 in Regulation 1612/68, which means that the 
children to workers shall enjoy the same right to education under equal 
conditions as the children to nationals in the host Member State. In 
subsequent judgements of Alaimo, Di Leo, Bernini and Meuseen the CJEU 
upheld that principle of equal treatment as the determining factor to settle 
what the right contained. The children to workers have under Article 12 in 
Regulation 1612/68 the right to study grants, to pursue and finish their 
education even high education, and they may under equal conditions also go 
to another Member State.  
 
Emphasise has been put on the child’s ability to be able to pursue and finish 
the education successfully. In this respect another line of case law namely 
Baumbast, Ibrahim, Texiera and Alarape appeared, establishing the right of 
the child to be joined by a primary carer. CJEU ensured that the right to 
education would not lose its useful effect, in the case the worker ceased to 
work in the host Member State, did not have sufficient means and a 
comprehensive sickness insurance or was a third-country national with no 
other right to residence in the host Member State. In respect of this CJEU 
attached a derived right to residence to a primary carer in order for the child 
to be able to finish his or her educations. A child that has come in 
enjoyment of the right to education shall be able to pursue it. In respect of 
this the acquired right to education it does not allow any   restrictions 
imposed on children to workers in comparison with the children of nationals 
in the host Member State. They shall enjoy the same rights and without 
exceptions, the same possibilities to pursue their education successfully. In 
other words, the workers child’s right to education mirrors back from the 
rights the child of the national has to education. When the rights are 
mirrored back completely then the child becomes fully integrated into the 
education system in the host Member State. 
 
Within the legal field of EU citizenship the child’s right appeared as an 
individual right, which is conferred to the child from Article 20 TFEU. The 
status of EU citizenship does rest solely upon the necessary condition that 
the individual is a national of a Member State.  Zhu and Chen confirmed 
that this was a status which was not tied to age; rather it was tied to the 
nationality of the individual. Catherine was namely only an infant when 
CJEU confirmed that she was entitled to rely on her status, the status as an 
EU citizen. When the child is a national of a Member State this means that 
the child also is an EU citizen and may rely on Article 20. Article 20 TFEU 
is however a rather constrained Article, which only applies in the extreme 
situation. It was applied in Ruiz Zambrano where it was held that when the 
EU citizen was at the risk of losing the substance of the rights contained in 
Article 20 TFEU then that provision would apply even if there was no cross-
border link. 
 
The risk which nevertheless activated the application Article 20 TFEU lied 
in the circumstance that the EU citizen child would be forced to leave the 
territory of the Member State where the child was a national; had the third-
country national parents not been granted residence in the Member State the 
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family was living in. CJEU considered that it was not an acceptable solution 
and applied the substance of rights doctrine. 
For the child’s right as an EU citizen this meant that a minimum safety-net 
was provided the child giving full effect to the EU citizenship, through 
allowing the parents to remain in the Member State with the child. CJEU 
Further confirmed in Alopka that each Member State has a responsibility 
towards its own citizens. Mrs Alopka a third-country national mother of 
twins with France nationality living in Luxemburg did not have sufficient 
resources and a comprehensive sickness insurance for her twins EU citizens 
to be able to rely on Article 21 TFEU. CJEU held that Mrs Alopka could 
rely on Article 20 TFEU if she moved with the children to France.   
 
However this is a minimum condition and it may not always keep families 
together, even if that is not in the best interest of child pursuant Article 24 
CFR and breach the right to family life in Article 7 CFR since the CFR does 
not apply when there is no cross-border link according Article 51(2) CFR. 
In O and S CJEU confirmed the McCarthy and Dereci line of reasoning that 
limited the application of the substance of rights doctrine contained in Ruiz 
Zambrano to only encompass the situation when the EU-citizen was forced 
to leave EU as a whole. CJEU interpreted that Article 20 TFEU did not 
prevent national laws which required that the third-country national had to 
have sufficient resources in order to not be expelled from the Member State. 
The fact that the third-country national stepfather was living with the EU-
citizen child was not a reason for preventing such an application. Because 
the child would be able to remain in the Member State, with the mother and 
primary carer whom held a residence permit under the national laws.   
 
For the child to have a right to rely on Article 21 TFEU and be able to 
exercise his or her right to free movement the child must have, as was held 
in Zhu and Chen and confirmed not the least in Alopka sufficient resources 
and a comprehensive sickness insurance. This is in line with how the EU 
citizenship right applies to adult EU citizens who do want to become 
economically active in the host Member State. Due to the fact that the child 
is dependent upon his or her parents, to give the right contained in Article 
21 TFEU effect the CJEU has given the child a right to be accompanied by 
the primary carer. The primary carer thereby receives a derived right vis-à-
vis the child’s right to free movement. For the primary carer to receive the 
derived right though, he or she must actually accompany the child. It is not 
sufficient that the parent visits the child in the host Member State. Not even 
on a regular basis to remain in contact with the child, as has been concluded 
in CJEU in Iida. In respect of this the interest CJEU has endeavoured to 
maintain in regard to EU-citizenship is to give full effect to the EU-
citizenship as a right that contains two aspects. The first aspect is to 
ensuring that no EU-citizen may risk being deprived of the status EU-citizen 
by being forced to leave EU, due to the circumstance that the EU-citizen 
happens to be a child to third-country national parents. The second aspect 
that the CJEU has sought to accomplish is to ensure that when the EU-
citizen exercises the right to free movement, he or she may be accompanied 
by a primary carer in order for the right to have any useful effect. In 
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addition, it may be added that the principle effet utile both was used in 
regard to give the child’s right to education useful effect as well as the EU-
citizenship.             
 
Within the legal field of child protection and the application of the Brussels 
II-Regulation, which basically contains jurisdictional rules it appears to me 
that they are being applied rather static. Which emanates into cases which 
appears to not consider the best interest of the child, even if this is one of the 
main objectives Brussel II-Regulation seek to protect.  This may be 
explained by two behind lying reasons. The first that the principle of the 
mutual recognition contained in the Brussel II-Regulation requires that 
judgement of other jurisdictions are being respected and enforced in the 
Member State where the child is present that has been abducted. The second 
reason that the objective with the Brussel II-Regulation allows no 
exceptions from the main rule, not even under circumstances when that 
seems necessary in order to protect the well-being of the child. The 
objective with the Brussel II-Regulation simply stipulates that the objective 
is to return children that have been abducted as quickly as possible.   
 
This objective in its turn provides that all return orders are urgent and 
therefor may not any protective provisional measure in order to prevent the 
child from being returned be taken. They are per definition urgent and the 
requirement is therefore impossible to fulfil, when an order of return has 
been certified in a judgment concerning parental responsibility by the court 
that has substantial jurisdiction. That will say the court were the child is 
habitual resident. However in regard to were the child has his or her habitual 
resident two concepts are being used. Firstly, in the case the child was 
moved to another Member State with the parent that has sole custody rights 
and thereby has moved lawfully. A test shall apply in regard to where the 
child is habitual resident if a parent in the cross-border relation wants to 
claim custody rights in regard to the child. This test is flexible and consists 
of an analysis of all important aspects of the child’s stay in the Member 
State.   
 
Secondly, in the case the child moved unlawful to the other Member State 
because the parent who took the child did not have sole custody rights. In 
that case is always the court were the child lived prior to the unlawful move 
the court that is considered to be the best suited court to handle the issue. 
Any change in circumstances, which shows that the child has adjusted into 
the social environment shall not be considered because in this situation is 
the best interest of the child to be returned.  
 
As if this wasn’t strange enough the 1980 Hauge Convention on child 
abduction, which the Brussel II-Regulation builds upon and refers to. Even 
if the Brussel II-Regulation has precedence of the Hauge Convention should 
it be totally disregarded from? Article 13 in the 1980 Hauge Convention 
stipulates that the national court were the child is present may refuse to 
enforce the order to return the child if the return would result in the if ‘there 
is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or 
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psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation’. 
Furthermore, the return may be refused if ‘the child objects to being 
returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is 
appropriate to take account of its views’.  Despite this the CJEU held that 
the return order had to be enforced in both the case, the child was going to 
be placed at a children’s home in the Member State were the child according 
to the Brussel II-Regulation had her habitual residence and was under a 
grave risk to suffer psychological harm. Similar was the situation in the case 
were the court with substantial jurisdiction first had issued that the father of 
the child was unsuited to have custody of the child. The child was deemed 
to be at a grave risk to suffer psychological harm. When the mother was 
reluctant to give the father access to the child the national court changed the 
judgement and gave the father full custody rights.       
 
In respect of this it is rather complicated to draw any other conclusion then 
the two main stirring interests are that recognisable judgements shall be 
recognised and enforced and that children that have been abducted shall be 
returned.  Also in the case it is unlikely that the court that has substantive 
jurisdiction will reach another verdict in the best interest of the child. Just 
because the child has been ordered back and a new application for the 
breach of the child’s fundamental right has been filed to that court. CJEU 
has failed in regard to the rights of the child to reach forward to a well-
balanced interpretation of the Brussel II-Regulation. No circumstances are 
the same. Room for an exemption from the main rule when this is called for, 
that favour the true meaning of the best interest of the child would bring the 
Brussel II-Regulation into the twenty-first century.    
 
Lastly, also the third question will be dealt with, namely: Does the right of 
the child or the non-existence of the rights of the child raise any problematic 
issues in EU law? An answer will be provided that touches upon 
problematic arising within each of the set-out paradigms for the writing of 
this thesis. To begin with, it is important to stress that the child’s right to 
education is a free standing right once the child has acquired the right 
through the derived right to rely on Regulation 1612/68 coming from the 
workers right. Also that this right has been interpreted by CJEU as 
conferring a derived right to a primary carer of the child in order for the 
child to be able to finish the education in the host Member State on equal 
terms as children to nationals. It is inherent though in the right that it 
provides a possibility for the family to plan for the child to make use of the 
child’s right to education, rather than that all children that have acquired 
such a right to education on equal terms with children of nationals will stay 
in the host Member State and actually finish the education there. Especially, 
this problematic is something that affects minor children to a larger extent 
than children that are self-reliant enough to make use of their rights fully 
themselves without their parents being physically present.  
 
CJEU has been precocious though and ensured that the child may be joined 
by a primary carer in order to finish the education in the host Member State. 
If may be added this also is a will of the parent. Nevertheless, since this 
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right does extend over all levels of education and also after the age the child 
has reached maturity. There may be a risk that Article 12 will be used as a 
measure for third-country national parents or EU-citizen parents that are no 
longer economically active and does not full fill the requirements in 
Directive 2004/38, to try to take advantage of the derived right by 
fraudulently claim that the child is in need of emotional support in order to 
be able to finish their education. Nevertheless, this problematic will be left 
to the national courts to detect and deal with.       
 
The fact that Regulation 1612/68 only concerns children to workers is 
another problematic aspect of the right to education in EU law. The 
delimitation means that all other children who are not children to a worker 
will be excluded from the scope of application. Unless, the CJEU would 
treat the right to education as a general principle in EU law also considering 
that Article 14 in CFR provides that everyone has a right to education. 
 
Furthermore, regarding children’s EU-citizenship rights, it is inevitable to 
not consider the phenomenon when the primary carer plans the birth of the 
child in a Member State, which applies jus soli. That has the effect to 
generate the status to the child of becoming a national of that Member State, 
and there through the child becomes an EU-citizen, which the third-country 
national primary carer has a derived right from to reside with the child 
within EU. The problematic is two divided. It is a good thing for the child’s 
right that CJEU has ensured that the child’s EU-citizenship shall be ensured 
and that the child may move freely within EU as well as not being forced to 
leave the territory of EU, even if the third-country national parent planned 
or because of different other circumstances gave birth to the child in a 
Member State of which the child acquired the nationality. Nevertheless, 
whether or not this is to be considered morally right or wrong may very well 
depend on the specific circumstances surrounding the Case in question, even 
if that has little to do with the particular right as such. In addition in regard 
to the child’s right to free movement only a limited group of people that has 
sufficient means will be able to benefit from the free movement contained in 
Article 21 TFEU. As well as it remains within in the Member States 
competence to decide who will be able to acquire the status nationality 
there.           
 
Within the paradigm of protectionism and the highlighted measure, more 
precisely the Brussles II-Regulation, the provisions does not so much 
concern the right of the child since they are jurisdictional rules. However, 
the provisions do have an impact on the child’s life and the static use of 
them may have negative effect for children. Such as under the circumstance 
the child has moved to another Member State with one of the parents in 
order for both to get away from an abusive parent for example. The impact 
of the child’s right or the non-existence of the child’s right may be immense 
when Brussles II-Regulation is applied in order to return a child that is 
considered to have been abducted. For instance when considering Article 
24(3) CFR, which provides that the child on a regular basis has a right to 
both, his or her parents. This right shall always be interpreted in the light of 
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the best interest of the child contained in Article 24(2) CFR. However, when 
the CJEU has used Article 24(3) in conjunction with the Brussles II-
Regulation it has only been used in a general sense neither referring to the 
individual case pointing out that the best interest of the child must be 
considered, nor departing from the objective contained in the Brussles II-
Regulation which is argued to inherently have been constructed in a manner, 
which protect the best interest of the child. The rights of the child in this 
context do only appear as a smokescreen to justify the underlying principle 
of mutual recognition of judgments.  
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